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Rethinking Anti-Corruption Reforms:
The View from Ancient Athens
KELLAM CONOVER†
INTRODUCTION
Corruption long has been a problem for democratization
and development. Over two millennia ago, Aristotle posited
that ruling in one’s own interest, not in the people’s
interest, causes polities to deviate from their intended
purpose—what he terms “corruption.”1 Contemporary
empirical research now supports his claim. On the one
hand, corruption can impede good governance by shortcreating
bureaucratic
circuiting
accountability,2
3
inefficiency, and undermining government legitimacy.4
† J.D., Stanford Law School (2013); Ph.D., Classics, Princeton University (2010);
B.A., Greek and Latin, Swarthmore College (2003). It is with great pleasure
that I thank Josh Ober, David Engstrom, and Janet Alexander for very helpful
comments on an earlier version of this paper; members of a Stanford Law course
on law and institutional design for insightful discussion; and Elizabeth
Monachino and the editors at the Buffalo Law Review for their meticulous work
in preparing this article. For convenience, I have cited to the Loeb Classical
Library edition—with facing ancient Greek text and English translation—
wherever possible. All translations, however, are mine.
1. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 3, § 1279a29-33 (H. Rackham trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press rev. & reprt. ed. 1990) (Arist. Pol. 1279a29-33). Elsewhere
Aristotle uses the word diaptheirein (“to corrupt”) to describe this process. E.g.,
id. at bk. 5, § 1302b (diephtharē). On Aristotle’s account of political corruption,
see J. Peter Euben, Corruption, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE 220, 227-29 (Terence Ball et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Euben,
Corruption].
2. See Daniel Lederman et al., Accountability and Corruption: Political
Institutions Matter, 17 ECON. & POL. 1, 4-5 (2005).
3. See MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND
DEMOCRACY 30 (2005) [hereinafter JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION];
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND REFORM 113-74 (1999) [hereinafter ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND
GOVERNMENT]; Daniel Treisman, What Have We Learned About the Causes of
Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?, ANN. REV.
POL. SCI., June 2007, at 211, 236-37.
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Democracies, particularly stable democracies, thus are
thought to exhibit the lowest levels of corruption.5 On the
other hand, political corruption can cause distortions in
economic markets and have an adverse effect on economic
investment.6 Hence, high rates of corruption correlate with
low rates of economic growth.7
Given these empirical correlations, it is perhaps
unsurprising that a near consensus has emerged on how to
design anti-corruption reforms: simply create institutions
that resemble polities with seemingly the least corruption,
namely, neo-liberal western democracies.8 Yet, although
4. Christopher J. Anderson & Yuliya V. Tverdova, Corruption, Political
Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies,
47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 91, 104 (2003). Morris and Klesner similarly link corruption
to lower levels of political trust. Stephen D. Morris & Joseph L. Klesner,
Corruption and Trust: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from Mexico, 43
COMP. POL. STUD. 1258, 1260-63 (2010).
5. E.g., Lederman et al., supra note 2, at 22-25; Daniel Treisman, The
Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study, 27 J. PUB. ECON. 399, 433-35
(2000) [hereinafter Treisman, The Causes of Corruption]. Conversely, a high
perception of corruption correlates with weak institutions, particularly
authoritarian ones. See, e.g., JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION, supra note
3, at 25-26; Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON.
599, 615-16 (1993). Note, though, that the causality here is not conclusive. See
Treisman, The Causes of Corruption, supra, at 433-35. Democracies do not
necessarily reduce the amount of total corruption. See JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF
CORRUPTION, supra note 3, at 194-95.
6. See, e.g., JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION, supra note 3, at 26-28;
ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 3, at 7-26; Alberto
Ades & Rafael Di Tella, The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and Some
New Results, 45 POL. STUD. 496, 514 (1997); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and
Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 695-700 (1995); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 5, at
611-15.
7. Mauro, supra note 6, at 700-05; Treisman, The Causes of Corruption,
supra note 5, at 429-30. Similarly, Ades and Di Tella link openness to trade with
lower levels of corruption, Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, Rents, Competition,
and Corruption, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 982, 991-92 (1999), although this might be an
endogenous factor, see Treisman, The Causes of Corruption, supra note 5, at
435.
8. See JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION, supra note 3, at 22-23; ROSEACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 3, at 63-68; Lederman et
al., supra note 2, at 27-28; see also DOUGLAS C. NORTH ET AL., VIOLENCE AND
SOCIAL ORDERS 151-181 (2009) (detailing key “doorstep” conditions—rule of law
among elites, “perpetually lived” forms of public and private organizations, and
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scholars have extensively investigated the perceived causes
and consequences of corruption, they have focused
comparatively little on measuring the actual success, or
failure, of anti-corruption reforms.9 What evidence we do
have suggests that the hallmarks of anti-corruption reform
agendas have enjoyed only mixed success in the developing
world: recommended reforms simply work better in some
places than in others.10
One reason for this might be that corruption reflects
deep structural problems in a society, like inequality or
variable access to political and judicial institutions. 11 To the
extent that corruption undermines collective action12 or
represents a “systemic degeneration of those practices and
commitments that provide the terms of collective selfunderstanding and shared purpose,”13 a different kind of
institutional design might be needed to combat it.14 In
political control of the military—requisite for transition to an “open access”
order).
9. Mark Robinson, Corruption and Development: An Introduction, in
CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 12-13 (Mark Robinson ed., 1998). See
generally JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION, supra note 3, at 16-35.
10. For further discussion, see JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION, supra
note 3, at 31-35; ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 3,
at 4-6; Robinson, supra note 9, at 6, 10; Jakob Svensson, Eight Questions About
Corruption, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2005, at 19, 35-36.
11. See ERIC M. USLANER, CORRUPTION, INEQUALITY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 5893 (2008) [hereinafter USLANER, CORRUPTION]; Michael Johnston, Corruption,
Inequality, and Change, in CORRUPTION, DEVELOPMENT, AND INEQUALITY 13, 1337 (Peter M. Ward ed., 1989); Eric M. Uslaner, Trust and Corruption, in THE
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 76, 89 (Johann Graf Lambsdorff
et al. eds., 2005). As Morris adds, part of the problem might be that empirical
analysis based on the perception of corruption measures something other than
the actual prevalence of corruption. See Stephen D. Morris, Disaggregating
Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America
with a Focus on Mexico, 27 BULL. LATIN. AM. RES. 388, 393 (2008).
12. Mark E. Warren, What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?, 48 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 328, 338-39 (2004).
13. Euben, Corruption, supra note 1, at 222-23.
14. Thus, for Thompson, the kind of “institutional corruption” that exists in
western democracies requires a shift in analytical paradigms. See DENNIS F.
THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION
6-7 (1995). Similarly, Johnston suggests a different slate of reforms, geared
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addition to deterring discrete acts of corruption, such reform
might also need to promote “deep democratization.”15
This paper considers a case study of anti-corruption
reforms that, I argue, could have promoted just such deep
democratization. The case study comes from ancient
Athens, and I will examine here the way the Athenians
designed their laws and legal institutions to combat bribery.
I focus on Athens’ regulation of bribery specifically, as
opposed to corruption more generally, because ancient
evidence for bribery is both more continuous and more
detailed than it is for corruption.16
Athens’ anti-bribery reforms are important even today
because, by modern standards, Athens was a success of
democratization and development, and many of her antibribery reforms were paradigmatic. Even so, the Athenian
approach to dealing with bribery differed in crucial ways
from contemporary anti-corruption reform agendas, for the
Athenians actively designed their laws and political
institutions to promote democratic values rather than to
optimize corruption levels.17 This resulted in one especially
towards various “syndromes” of corruption that exist across countries.
JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION, supra note 3, at 200-03.
15. Michael Johnston has been the most vocal proponent of just such a multitiered approach to corruption reform. See JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF
CORRUPTION, supra note 3, at 195-220; see also Warren, supra note 12, at 341.
16. The vast majority of embezzlement trials at Athens pertain to a specific
period (the 390s BCE) and have been examined by Strauss. See Barry S.
Strauss, The Cultural Significance of Bribery and Embezzlement in Athenian
Politics: The Evidence of the Period 403-386 B.C., 11 THE ANCIENT WORLD 67, 6774 (1985). Extortion by public officials was exceptionally rare in the ancient
sources. I count only three references to the generals: Miltiades, HERODOTUS,
The Histories, in 3 HERODOTUS bk. 6, ch. 136, § 1 (A.D. Godley trans., Harvard
Univ. Press rev. & reprt. ed. 1963) (Hdt. 6.136); Thrasybulus of Steiria, LYSIAS,
Against Ergocles, in LYSIAS §§ 5-6, 12, 17 (W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard Univ.
Press reprt. ed. 1967) (Lys. 28.5-6, 12, 17), and Thrasybulus of Collytus,
DEMOSTHENES, Against Timocrates, in 3 DEMOSTHENES: AGAINST MEIDIAS,
ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON ch. 24, § 134 (J.A. Vince
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1964) (Dem. 24.134). Looking beyond public
corruption, Athens seems to have had trouble with private citizens bringing
frivolous legal suits in order to extort money, although this was perhaps not as
widespread as the ancient sources indicate. See MATTHEW R. CHRIST, THE
LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN 63-67 (1998) [hereinafter CHRIST, THE LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN].
17. See discussion infra Part I.
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novel approach to anti-corruption enforcement: the creation
of a private right of action for bribery suits so that anybody
who wanted could prosecute an official for bribery.18
Part I shows how deep democratization permeated the
design of Athens’ anti-bribery reforms. Although it is
impossible to measure the absolute efficacy of these
reforms, Part II surveys evidence suggesting that, over
time, these reforms successfully shifted Athens toward less
disruptive forms of corruption. Part III then looks in detail
at one aspect of Athens’ anti-bribery laws that could have
brought about this shift: the private right of action for
bribery suits. I analyze this feature from an institutional
design perspective to gauge what effect it may have had in
Athens. In the Conclusion, I extend this analysis to consider
the potentially valuable corrective Athenian-style reforms
might provide for contemporary anti-corruption agendas.
I. ATHENS’ ANTI-BRIBERY REFORMS: A STUDY IN
DEMOCRATIZATION
Contemporary anti-corruption agendas try to design
institutions that prevent inherently corrupt actors from
acting corruptly; accordingly, they focus on the intent of
bribe-giving or bribe-taking officials. By contrast, the
Athenians looked not to an actor’s intent, but to the result
of his actions: they designed their institutions to foster
outcomes that were in the people’s interest, in a sense
democratizing anti-corruption enforcement processes. As we
will see, this crucial conceptual difference resulted in
greater attention to the design of enforcement procedures.
Let’s take a closer look.
Two common themes recur throughout contemporary
anti-corruption reform agendas: a focus on bribery
specifically; and a conceptualization of corruption as a
principal-agent problem familiar from economic analysis.19
18. See discussion infra Part III.
19. See, e.g., DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & ALBERTO VANNUCCI, CORRUPT
EXCHANGES: ACTORS, RESOURCES, AND MECHANISMS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION 1618 (1999); ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 22-24 (1988); ROSEACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 3, at 5 (“The primary goal
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In other words, contemporary anti-corruption agendas take
what has been called a “rotten apple” account.20 They
typically define corruption as an illegal use of power for
personal gain and then posit that those who commit
corruption consciously choose to do so upon a rational
calculus of costs and benefits.21 If the costs of bribery
outweigh the benefits, the theory goes, no rational agent
would choose to take or give a bribe.22
Consequently, their suggested reforms focus on
deterring an agent from committing bribery: to do so, simply
reduce discretion, eliminate monopolistic control, and

[of anti-corruption reform agendas] should be to reduce the underlying
incentives to pay and receive bribes, not to tighten systems of ex post control.”);
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 4-10 (1978)
[hereinafter ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY]. For
a critique of the “new consensus” in corruption scholarship that emerged in the
1990s, see JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION, supra note 3, at 6.
20. John Warburton, Corruption as a Social Process: From Dyads to
Networks, in CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION 221, 221 (Peter Larmour & Nick
Wolanin eds., 2001).
21. For this market-based approach to corruption, see ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 3, at 143-74 (deriving reforms from
market-based analysis of political corruption); ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A
STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 6-10; Edward C. Banfield,
Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J.L. & ECON. 587,
587-91 (1975); A.W. Goudie & David Stasavage, A Framework for the Analysis of
Corruption, 29 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 113, 116-19 (1998); Johann Graf
Lambsdorff, Making Corrupt Deals: Contracting in the Shadow of the Law, 48 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 221, 221-39 (2002). This kind of approach has been
criticized both for failing to explain collaboration and cooperation within politics
(i.e., altruistic acts at odds with an inherently selfish rational actor), see John D.
DiIulio, Jr., Principled Agents: The Cultural Bases of Behavior in a Federal
Government Bureaucracy, 4 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 277, 281-82 (1994),
and for failing to predict the efficacy of certain anti-corruption reforms, see
Robinson, supra note 9, at 3-5.
22. See, e.g., KLITGAARD, supra note 19, at 22 (“[T]he agent will act corruptly
when her likely net benefits from doing so outweigh the likely net costs.”); ROSEACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 88
(“The chapters which follow thus develop a theory of bureaucracy in which
officials are self-interested and untrustworthy. They follow the rules only if
they, on the balance, gain.”).
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increase accountability.23 Note how, in this context, what
matters is optimizing the level of corruption so that the
marginal cost of enforcement does not exceed the marginal
cost of more corruption.24 Thus, something like greater
transparency is valued only as a structural change and only
to the extent that it fosters optimal enforcement; it is not
valued in its own right as, say, an essential or indispensable
norm in a democratic polity. This is characteristic of how
the “rotten apple” approach focuses more on optimizing
institutional structures than on changing institutional
norms. Attempting to change an institutional norm—like by
instilling greater public spiritedness—is an afterthought at
best in these agendas.25
Where contemporary reform agendas thus focus on
corrupt intent, Athenians conceptualized bribery in terms of
a bad outcome. The Athenian word for bribery was
dōrodokia, which literally meant “the receipt of gifts in
expectation of something bad.”26 There was no word for
‘bribes,’ and without a bad outcome associated with the
gifts, there was no bribery to speak of. The main law
against bribery, for example, explicitly defined the offense of
bribery as whenever someone gives or receives “to the harm
of the people.”27 What mattered to the Athenians, therefore,
23. E.g., KLITGAARD, supra note 19, at 74-75; ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION
GOVERNMENT, supra note 3, at 39-68; Goudie & Stasavage, supra note 21, at
117-19.

AND

24. E.g., FRANK ANECHIARICO AND JAMES B. JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE
INTEGRITY: HOW CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE 153-208
(1996) (arguing that, because corruption controls impose costs by perpetuating
bureaucratic pathologies, anti-corruption reforms should take into account those
additional costs); KLITGAARD, supra note 19, at 24-27; ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 4.
25. See, e.g., KLITGAARD, supra note 19, at 90-93; ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 3, at 143-74.
26. On this translation, see KELLAM CONOVER, BRIBERY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS
46-54 (PH.D. DISSERTATION, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 2010). For the Athenian
focus on bad outcomes, see also F.D. Harvey, Dona Ferentes: Some Aspects of
Bribery in Greek Politics, 6 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 76, 108-13 (1985).
27. See DEMOSTHENES, Against Meidias, in 3 DEMOSTHENES: AGAINST
MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON, supra note 16,
§ 113 (Dem. 21.113).
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was the perceived result of the gifts, not the context in or
intent with which they were given.
More specifically, the bad outcome at the heart of
bribery was frequently viewed as a violation of a civic trust:
bribes effectively severed the reciprocal bonds of friendship
between an official and the people.28 In this respect, the
Athenian conception of bribery dovetails closely with
sociological models of corruption. Both hinge on how corrupt
agents frame their own actions in terms of local norms
within a micro-social context.29 What is nevertheless
distinctive about the Athenian approach is that by
definition such framing was subordinated to broader public
norms: in Athenian law, the normative value of the bribe
was measured according to whether or not its receipt
harmed the people. Bribery trials, therefore, were less about
whether an official truly took any gifts and more about
whether those gifts were in the public interest.30
Unlike in contemporary reform agendas, in Athens the
norms guiding public officials’ behavior were front and
center in her anti-corruption reforms. Rather than aim for
an optimal level of policing, these reforms focused on
defining and reifying the norms of democratic governance.31
The Athenians thus took a deep democratization approach
28. So Leslie Kurke writes, “gift-giving . . . becomes negatively inflected as
‘bribery’ (dôrodokia) when it is felt to interfere with a citizen’s obligations to his
civic community.” Leslie Kurke, Money and Mythic History: The Contestation of
Transactional Orders in the Fifth Century BC, in THE ANCIENT ECONOMY 87, 94
(Walter Scheidel & Sitta von Reden eds., 2002). For further discussion, see
CONOVER, supra note 26, at 70-71.
29. See JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF ET AL., THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
CORRUPTION 53-55 (2005); Mark Granovetter, The Social Construction of
Corruption, in ON CAPITALISM 152, 152 (Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg eds.,
2007). Conversely, citizens frame corruption in terms of trust within the microsocial context of a citizen’s own relation to the government. See, e.g., USLANER,
CORRUPTION, supra note 11, at 89 (stating that corruption diminishes
generalized trust); Anderson & Tverdova, supra note 4, at 103-05 (arguing that
political allegiance strongly affects perceptions of corruption and trust in civil
servants); Morris & Klesner, supra note 4, at 1276 (noting that corruption
breeds distrust, which diminishes people’s willingness to work with the
government to fight corruption).
OF

30. See CONOVER, supra note 26, at 84-85.
31. Id. at 247-48.
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to anti-corruption reform: their laws against judicial,
executive, and legislative bribery all were designed to foster
democratic values. Importantly, these reforms reflect deep
thinking about the institutional design of enforcement
proceedings—something that is virtually absent from
contemporary reform agendas. As Part III will show, such
an approach may have made Athens’ reforms more, not less,
effective in the long run.
Two preliminary notes. My grouping into “judicial,”
“executive,” and “legislative” functions is purely to aid the
reader. The Athenians had no concept of separation of
powers: their polity was designed not to split power among
co-equal branches, but to ensure that the people (dēmos)
exercised power through the Assembly, courtroom, and
public offices.32 Also, I take essentially a synchronic
approach here: for a historical overview of all Athenian antibribery reforms, see Appendix I.
A. Regulations Against Judicial Bribery
Judicial corruption ostensibly seems like it would have
been a non-issue in ancient Athens: how could someone
possibly bribe a jury of over 500 jurors, particularly when
those jurors were selected by lottery from a group of 6,000
potential jurors the morning of the trial?33 Yet, though it
might defy expectation, the Athenians repeatedly voiced
concerns that certain individuals had corrupted the courts.34
32. See, e.g., Josiah Ober, The Nature of Athenian Democracy, 84 CLASSICAL
PHILOLOGY 322, 327-31 (1989).
33. MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF
DEMOSTHENES 181 (J.A. Crook trans., 1991) [hereinafter HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN
DEMOCRACY].
34. The democrat Anytus, in particular, was renowned for having bribed a
jury to obtain an acquittal. See ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, in
ARISTOTLE: THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS, AND ON
VIRTUES AND VICES ch. 27, § 5 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. &
reprt. ed. 1967) (Athen. Pol. 27.5); CONOVER, supra note 26, at 282-83. Calhoun
persuasively sets forth the evidence suggesting that bribery involving the courts
was possible through Athens’ political clubs (hetaireiai). GEORGE MILLER
CALHOUN, ATHENIAN CLUBS IN POLITICS AND LITIGATION 66-76 (1913); see also
LENE RUBINSTEIN, LITIGATION AND COOPERATION: SUPPORTING SPEAKERS IN THE
COURTS OF CLASSICAL ATHENS 198-212 (2000).
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Indeed, in the mid-fourth century, the city reenrolled every
citizen, on the fear that some resident aliens had snuck onto
the citizen registries at corrupt citizenship trials.35 To
combat these fears, the Athenians repeatedly made
significant changes to their jury selection procedures to
prevent bribery.36 They also developed three different formal
procedures for bringing public suits (graphai; singular
graphē) concerning judicial bribery.37 As this Section shows,
both sets of reforms reinforced democratic values.
The Athenians enacted an astonishingly complex jury
selection process.38 Aristotle points out, no fewer than four
35. The reenrollment of 346/5 was proposed by Demophilus, who was known
for his public accusations of corruption during the citizen enrollment
procedures. See AESCHINES, Against Timarchus, in THE SPEECHES OF AESCHINES
§ 86 (Charles Darwin Adams trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1958)
(Aeschin. 1.86). On Demophilus’ decree and the reenrollment of 346/5, see DAVID
WHITEHEAD, THE DEMES OF ATTICA 508/7-CA. 250 BC: A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
STUDY 104-09 (1986). Citizen anger against those who had corrupted the citizen
enrollment process was reported by Demosthenes. DEMOSTHENES, Against
Eubulides, in 6 DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE ORATIONS § 49 (A.T. Murray trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1964) (Dem. 57.49).
36. E.g., Douglas M. MacDowell, Athenian Laws About Bribery, 20 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L’ANTIQUITÉ 57, 64-65 (1983) [hereinafter
MacDowell, Athenian Laws About Bribery].
37. On these laws and procedures, see HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY,
supra note 33, at 193-94; DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL
ATHENS 170-73, 183-86 (1978) [hereinafter MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL
ATHENS]; Claire Taylor, Bribery in Athenian Politics Part II: Ancient Reaction
and Perceptions, 48 GREECE & ROME 154, 154-57 (2001) [hereinafter Taylor,
Bribery in Athenian Politics Part II].
38. On this process, see MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS, supra
note 37, at 36-40; P.J. RHODES, A COMMENTARY ON THE ARISTOTELIAN ATHENAION
POLITEIA 697-716 (1981). Selection by lot was later viewed as a cornerstone of
the democracy. HERODOTUS, The Histories, in 2 HERODOTUS bk. 3, ch. 80, § 6
(A.D. Godley trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. & reprt. ed. 1963) (Hdt. 3.80); see
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 1, at bk. 2, § 1274a5, bk. 4, § 1294b7-9 (Aristot.
Pol. 1274a5, 1294b7-9); JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS:
RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE 76-77 (1989) [hereinafter
OBER, MASS AND ELITE]. Sortition was essential for including a more diverse
range of citizens in the workings of the polity. Claire Taylor, From the Whole
Citizen Body? The Sociology of Election and Lot in the Athenian Democracy, 76
HESPERIA 323, 338-40 (2007) [hereinafter Taylor, From the Whole Citizen Body].
Even so, it likely developed as a pro-elite instrument used to reduce elite
competition for office by ensuring broad representation and even distribution.
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times, that this process was designed to prevent the
corruption of jurors.39 Each juror was given a personalized
box-wood ticket with his name, his father’s name, his
community, and a letter of the alphabet A-K.40 On the
morning of a court day, jurors filed by tribe into one of ten
holding rooms and deposited their ticket into a chest
inscribed with a matching letter A-K on it.41 In each room an
affixer was appointed at random to draw ten tickets, one
from each chest, and affix those tickets to the lottery
machine.42 The archon then drew lots of white and black
copper dice, the white number corresponding to the number
of jurymen required.43 As the dice were slotted into the
lottery machine, they fell next to tickets affixed to the
machine. If a white die fell next to a ticket, that juror would
serve on a jury.44
Once jurors had been selected, another randomization
process was used to match each juror to a courtroom. First,
each selected juror drew from an urn an acorn inscribed
with a letter.45 He then entered a second holding room,
See Edwin M. Carawan, Eisangelia and Euthyna: The Trials of Miltiades,
Themistocles, and Cimon, 28 GREEK ROMAN & BYZANTINE STUD. 167, 208 (1987).
39. ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 64, § 2
(ticket-drawer chosen by lot to prevent mischief) (Athen. Pol. 64.2); id. ch. 64, § 4
(drawing of acorns prevents packing of jury panels) (Athen. Pol. 64.4.); id. ch. 65,
§ 1 (colored sticks and lintels prevent juror from purposely going into the wrong
jury court) (Athen. Pol. 65.1); ARISTOTLE: THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION ch. 66, §
2 (P.J. Rhodes trans. 1984) (men chosen by lot to work the water clock to
prevent dishonest arrangements) (Athen. Pol. 66.2); cf. ARISTOTLE, The Athenian
Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 66, § 1 (archons assigned to courts by lot to
prevent prior knowledge of assignment) (Athen. Pol. 66.1). On the sale of jury
allotments, see EUBULUS, Fragment, in 5 POETAE COMICI GRAECI 74 K-A (R.
Kassel & C. Austin eds. 1986) (Eubulus fr. 74 K). Aristotle is followed in the
main by MacDowell, MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS, supra note 37,
at 35-40, and Todd, S.C. TODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW 87 (1993).
40. ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 63, § 2
(Athen. Pol. 63.2).
41. Id. ch. 64, § 1 (Athen. Pol. 64.1).
42. Id. ch. 64, §§ 1-2 (Athen. Pol. 64.1-2).
43. Id. ch. 64, § 3 (Athen. Pol. 64.3).
44. Id. ch. 64, §§ 2-3 (Athen. Pol. 64.2-3).
45. Id. ch. 64, § 4 (Athen. Pol. 64.4).
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where the letter on his acorn was matched to the letter of a
specific courtroom.46 Each juror then received a colored staff
matching the color of a lintel on the doorway to the court
where he would serve.47 As jurors were selected, they
marched in color-coded procession to the courtrooms.48 This
process was repeated anew every single court day.
This complex jury selection ritual was actually a process
in democratization. It seems designed, first, to atomize
jurors so that they could not self-assemble into large voting
blocks, then to ritualize the allotment process through an
increasingly complex series of steps in order to remind
jurors of the very authority they held as dicasts. Note how
the sortition process first broke up jurors by tribe, then by
letter groups, precisely the two categories that would have
been most easily exploited for collusion. Then, after
atomizing jurors, the colored staffs and ceremonious ritual
transformed them from citizens into jurors.
Like other rituals in the Athenian polis, civic and
otherwise, one purpose of transforming the citizens into this
civic category of jurors was to foster a new solidarity among
participants qua dicasts, one thus drawn along public, not
private lines.49 In this respect, as more steps of the
allotment procedure became randomized, they also became
invested with greater social significance, creating greater
separation between ordinary citizen and authoritative juror.
Hence, the involvement of more jurors in executing the
selection process or the use of more props (tickets, colored
staffs) to dramatize the jurors’ roles fostered an important

46. Id. ch. 64, § 5-ch. 65, § 1 (Athen. Pol. 64.1-65.1).
47. Id. ch. 65, §1 (Athen. Pol. 65.1).
48. Id. ch. 65, §2 (Athen. Pol. 65.2).
49. Victor Bers underscores the ritual aspects of the sortition process but
ultimately claims that the process was meant to assuage non-jurors of the
number and probity of jurors selected. See Victor Bers, Just Rituals: Why the
Rigmarole of Fourth-Century Athenian Lawcourts?, in POLIS AND POLITICS:
STUDIES IN ANCIENT GREEK HISTORY 553, 557-58 (Pernille Flensted-Jensen et al.
eds., 2000). By contrast, I would point to the very real significance that the
ritual could have for the participating jurors themselves.
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kind of social separation.50 In essence, the Athenians
designed the jury selection procedure not merely to
minimize the chance of corruption, but especially to instill
in jurors the political value of judging justice at armslength.
Like the jury selection process, Athens’ formal
procedures against judicial bribery also were designed to
reinforce democratic values. There was the graphē
dekasmou for those who had bribed a judicial body;51 the
penalty for conviction was death.52 The graphē dōroxenias
was presumably attached to a law against bribing a jury to
acquit a defendant in a citizenship trial;53 the penalty is
unknown but was likely outlawry (a kind of exile).54 And we
hear of an unnamed graphē for indicting public prosecutors
(synēgoroi) who had taken gifts for a public or private suit;
that penalty is unknown.55 Anybody who wanted—
50. The implementation of the lot at each step of the way may very well have
been a reminder of the profoundly religious character of the jurors’ office, as
signaled by the oath of the heliasts sworn by all potential jurors each year. On
the religious and secular dimensions of the lot, see id. at 558-59.
51. DEMOSTHENES, Against Stephanus 2, in 5 DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE
ORATIONS § 26 (A.T. Murray trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1964) (Dem.
46.26); Yuzuru Hashiba, Athenian Bribery Reconsidered: Some Legal Aspects, 52
CAMBRIDGE CLASSICAL J. 62, 67 (2006); MacDowell, Athenian Laws About
Bribery, supra note 36, at 66-68.
52. AESCHINES, Against Timarchus, in THE SPEECHES OF AESCHINES, supra
note 35, §§ 86-87 (Aeschin. 1.86-7); ISOCRATES, On the Peace, in ISOCRATES § 50
(George Norlin trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. 1962) (Isoc. 8.50).
53. ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 59, § 3
(Athen. Pol. 59.3); MacDowell, Athenian Laws About Bribery, supra note 36, at
68-69.
54. Outlawry was a kind of effective exile in which a citizen (and his
property) lost all protection from the law. Anyone so penalized was thus subject
to property theft or violent crime with no legal remedy. In the face of such risks,
most outlawed individuals chose to leave Athens permanently. See MOGENS
HERMAN HANSEN, EISANGELIA: THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT IN
ATHENS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C. AND THE IMPEACHMENT OF GENERALS AND
POLITICIANS 55-56 (1975) [hereinafter HANSEN, EISANGELIA]. For a defense that
outlawry was the penalty for being convicted in a graphē dōroxenias, see
CONOVER, supra note 26, at 290-91 n.76.
55. See DEMOSTHENES, Against Stephanus 2, in 5 DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE
ORATIONS, supra note 51, § 26 (depicting a graphē before the thesmothetai)
(Dem. 46.26). For more discussion, see RUBINSTEIN, supra note 34, at 52-53.
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regardless of whether he had been affected by the bribery—
could bring one of these suits.56 Withdrawing the suit before
trial or failing to win one-fifth of the jury votes, however,
resulted in a substantial fine (nearly one-and-a-half years’
pay for a skilled worker) and loss of the right to bring that
kind of prosecution again.57
There were two ways in which the design of these laws
and procedures fostered democratic values. First, their
wording was substantively vague. The graphē dekasmou
allowed the prosecution of anyone who “bribe[d] the Heliaia
or any of the courts in Athens or the Council by giving
money for the purpose of bribery.”58 The graphē dōroxenias
suit was allowed whenever it seemed that someone’s
acquittal at a citizenship trial had been “unjust.”59 And the
unnamed graphē targeted public prosecutors suspected of
taking money “for the sake of a judicial suit.”60 Nowhere are
“bribery,” “unjust,” or “for the sake of a judicial suit” legally
defined; rather, as with many substantively vague Athenian
laws, what seemed to be on trial was the norm itself.61
Likely, the public prosecutors mentioned in the law were the twenty prosecutors
who brought allegations of corruption against public officials at their mandatory
financial audit. On these prosecutors, see HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY,
supra note 33, at 222.
56. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 222.
57. This was the standard penalty for all graphai. See DEMOSTHENES, Against
Neaera, in 6 DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE ORATIONS, supra note 35, § 16 (Dem. 59.16).
58. DEMOSTHENES, Against Stephanus 2, in 5 DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE
ORATIONS, supra note 51, § 26 (Dem. 46.26).
59. Hyperides, Fragments, Against Aristagora for Failure to Obtain a Patron
I and II, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES,
HYPERIDES ch. 28 § 2 (J.O. Burtt trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1980)
(Hyp. fr. 28.2 Blass).
60. DEMOSTHENES, Against Stephanus 2, in 5 DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE
ORATIONS, supra note 51, § 26 (Dem. 46.26).
61. The substantive vagueness of Athenian laws was noted already in
antiquity. ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 9, § 2
(Athen. Pol. 9.2); see ARISTOTLE, THE “ART” OF RHETORIC, bk.1, § 1354a27-30
(J.H. Freese trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1959) (Arist. Rhet. 1.1354a27-30); cf.
The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 35, § 2 (Athen. Pol. 35.2);. For a
discussion on this point, see CONOVER, supra note 26, at 226 & n.23; ADRIAAN
LANNI, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS OF CLASSICAL ATHENS 117-18 (2006)
[hereinafter LANNI, LAW AND JUSTICE]; Christopher Carey, Legal Space in
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For each procedure, then, it is plausible that a
prosecutor would have to advocate why a previous jury trial
had resulted in a bad outcome—an unjust acquittal or,
possible with the graphē dekasmou, an unjust conviction.62
By placing the norm on trial, these suits reinforced the
democracy’s commitment to popular justice, for it was
ultimately a popular jury’s decision about what constituted
bribery or an unjust outcome that won out. Moreover, that
it was private citizens, and not government officials, who
usually initiated these suits only maintained the Athenian
commitment to a limited state.63
In addition to reaffirming Athens’ commitment to
popular justice, these trials actually re-legitimated the very
democratic processes that had been threatened by judicial
corruption in the first place. Normally there was no
appellate review in Athens: in line with the democratic ideal
that the people’s decisions were authoritative, there simply
was no higher body to which one could appeal a decision. 64
Although we have no attested examples of their use, these
suits seem to have offered the opportunity for judicial
review of a sort, with an eye toward achieving a correct
result. Importantly, they repeated the judicial process, but
with a larger jury.65 This had the effect of decreasing the
risk of potential error and, given how difficult it would have
been to bribe a jury in the first place, decreasing the risk of
Classical Athens, 41 GREECE & ROME 177, 178-79 (1994); S.C. Todd, The
Language of Law in Classical Athens, in THE MORAL WORLD OF THE LAW 17, 2930 (Peter Coss ed., 2000).
62. Hyperides, Fragments, Against Aristagora for Failure to Obtain a Patron
I and II, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES,
HYPERIDES, supra note 59, at ch. 28, § 2 (Hyp. fr. 28.2 Blass).
63. On this point, see Adriaan Lanni, Social Norms in the Courts of Ancient
Athens, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 691, 726-27 (2009) [hereinafter Lanni, Social
Norms].
64. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 189. Earlier there
had been appeal to a popular court (ephesis) from a judgment by a magistrate,
but there was no similar sort of appeal for trials that had been before a popular
court in the first instance. Id.
65. Note how, because these were important public trials, the juries likely
may have exceeded the regular size of 201 jurors for private suits or 501 for
public suits. See HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 187.
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renewed corruption, as well.66 By repeating the process, and
hopefully achieving a more just result, the Athenians
thereby reaffirmed the legitimacy of their courts. This could
have been a particularly helpful practice in the face of
judicial corruption that otherwise threatened to erode the
public’s trust in the courts.67
B. Regulations Against Executive Bribery
Executive officials were not life-long professionals in
Athens: virtually all officials served just one-year terms.
The great majority served on boards of ten in positions
acquired by entering a voluntary lottery similar to that for
the jury selection process.68 The only elected officials were
those requiring special expertise: namely, certain military
and financial leaders and ambassadors.69 But even officials
serving short terms could cause major problems for Athens’
“rule by the people” (dēmo-kratia). Thus, it was a defining
moment of the democracy when the people instituted public
accountability for public officials.70
Executive bribery was viewed, in this light, as a threat
to the supremacy of the people’s authority.71 The fear was
66. McCannon applies Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to Athenian jury sizes and
concludes that the larger juries empanelled for high-profile public cases would
have reduced the risk of possible error. Bryan McCannon, Jury Size in Classical
Athens: An Application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 64 KYKLOS 106, 113-18
(2011).
67. By reducing the risk of renewed corruption, these retrials would have
increased the perceived procedural fairness, which is essential for bolstering
legitimacy. See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and
Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 382-84 (2006). On the corrosive link
between institutional legitimacy and corruption, see Morris & Klesner, supra
note 4, at 1260-63.
68. See Taylor, From the Whole Citizen Body, supra note 38, at 323-24, 33031.
69. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 160.
70. See id. at 36-37; OBER, MASS AND ELITE, supra note 38, at 77-78; MARTIN
OSTWALD, FROM POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW 70-73
(1986); Sally Humphreys, The Evolution of Legal Process in Ancient Attica, in
TRIA CORDA: SCRITTI IN ONORE DI ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO 229, 242-47 (E. Gabba
ed., 1983).
71. For an overview of this idea, see CONOVER, supra note 26, at 96-112.
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that an executive official—a military general, for example,
or an overseer of the market—might disobey the people’s
will and enact a different policy, or enact the people’s policy
in way that was unjust. As a result, the Athenians held
accountable those generals who failed to sack certain
cities,72 ambassadors who failed to secure certain terms in
diplomatic negotiations,73 and other officials whose actions
seemed to cause harm to the polity.74
To combat executive bribery, the Athenians had two
main enforcement procedures: euthūnai (“straightening

72. Examples include Anytus, see ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution,
supra note 34, at ch. 27, § 5 (Athen. Pol. 27.5); Cimon, see PLUTARCH, Cimon, in
2 PLUTARCH’S LIVES: THEMISTOCLES AND CAMILLUS ARISTIDES AND CATO MAJOR
CIMON AND LUCULLUS ch. 14, §§ 1-4 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., Harvard Univ.
Press reprt. ed. 1967) (Plut. Cim. 14.1-4); PLUTARCH, Pericles, in 3 PLUTARCH’S
LIVES: PERICLES AND FABIUS MAXIMUS NICIAS AND CRASSUS ch. 10, § 6
(Bernadotte Perrin trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1967) (Plut. Per. 10.6);
Sophocles, Pythodorus, and Eurymedon, see 2 THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR bk. 4, ch. 65, §§ 2-3 (Charles Forster Smith trans., Harvard
Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1965) (Thuc. 4.65.2-3); PHILOCHORUS, in 3B DIE
FRAGMENTE DER GRIECHISCHEN HISTORIKER (F GR H) ch. 328, § 127 (Philochorus
FGrH 328 F127); Demosthenes, cf. 2 THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR, supra, at bk. 3, ch. 98, § 5 (Thuc. 3.98.5); and Nicias, cf. 4
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR bk. 7, ch. 48, § 4 (Charles
Forster Smith, trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1965) (Thuc. 7.48.4).
73. Examples include Timagoras, see DEMOSTHENES, On the False Embassy,
in 2 DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA DE FALSA LEGATIONE §§ 31, 137, 191 (C.A. Vince
& J.H. Vince trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1963) (Dem. 19.31, 137,
191); PLUTARCH, Pelopidas, in 5 PLUTARCH’S LIVES: AGESILAUS AND POMPEY
PELOPIDAS AND MARCELLUS ch. 30, § 6 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., Harvard Univ.
Press reprt. ed. 1961) (Plut. Pelop. 30.6); XENOPHON, Hellenica, in 2 XENOPHON
bk. 7, ch. 1, § 38 (Carleton L. Brownson trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed.
1961) (Xen. Hell. 1.38); Epicrates, Onomasas, and Phormisius, see LYSIAS,
Against Epicrates and His Fellow Envoys, in LYSIAS, supra note 16, § 1 (Lys.
27.1); and Epicrates, see 3 ATHENAEUS, DEIPNOSOPHISTS bk 6, ch. 251 (S. Douglas
Olson, trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 2008) (Athen. 6.251); PLUTARCH,
Pelopidas, in 5 PLUTARCH’S LIVES: AGESILAUS AND POMPEY PELOPIDAS AND
MARCELLUS, supra, at ch. 30, § 7 (Plut. Pelop. 30.7).
74. For example, the general Timotheus was convicted of bribery for having
failed to help his fellow general Chares. See ISOCRATES, Antidosis, in ISOCRATES,
supra note 52, § 129 (Isocr. 15.129); Dinarchus, Against Demosthenes, in 2
MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note
59, § 14 (Din. 1.14); Dinarchus, Against Philocles, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS:
LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note 59, § 17 (Din. 3.17).
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out”), for officials who had just left office,75 and eisangelia,
(“denunciation”), for officials still in office.76 The euthūnai
were a mandatory audit of an official’s accounts and conduct
before a jury of 501; at this time, any individual who wanted
could bring an accusation of bribery.77 We do not know what
the wording of this law was, but it is likely that bribery was
defined as gifts given or received “to the harm of the
people.”78 The penalty for bribery at euthūnai was death or a
tenfold fine for the amount of the bribe.79
The eisangelia was the quintessential, and earliest, tool
for accountability at Athens: it was used for the most
serious offenses, including treason, political conspiracy, and
overthrowing the democracy.80 Thousands of citizens would
judge an eisangelia during a special meeting of the

75. See ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 54, § 2
(Athen. Pol. 54.2). For an overview of the euthūnai process, see HANSEN, THE
ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 222-24; MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN
CLASSICAL ATHENS, supra note 37, at 170-72.
76. See Hyperides, In Defence of Euxenippus, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS:
LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note 59, §§ 7-8, 29 (Hyp.
4.7-8, 29). For an overview of the eisangelia procedure, see HANSEN, THE
ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 212-18, and MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN
CLASSICAL ATHENS, supra note 37, at 183-86.
77. See ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 48, § 4
(Athen. Pol. 48.4); HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 222.
78. CONOVER, supra note 26, at 233-34; see DEMOSTHENES, Against
Timocrates, in 3 DEMOSTHENES: AGAINST MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES,
TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON, supra note 16, § 113 (Dem. 24.113).
79. See CONOVER, supra note 26, at 216 n.3; Dinarchus, Against Demosthenes,
in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra
note 59, § 60 (Din. 1.60); Hyperides, Against Demosthenes, in 2 MINOR ATTIC
ORATORS: LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note 59, at frag. 6
(Hyp. 5.2).
80. On the political significance of the eisangelia, see CONOVER, supra note
26, at 242; HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 215-18;
Hyperides, In Defence of Euxenippus, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS,
DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note 59, §§ 7-8, 29 (Hyp. 4.7-8, 29). The
eisangelia was thought to have been instituted by the lawgiver Solon nearly one
century before the democracy. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 1, at bk. 2, §
1274a15-18, bk. 3, § 1281b31-4 (Arist. Pol. 2.1274a15-18, 3.1281b31-4);
ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 9, § 1 (Athen. Pol.
9.1).
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Assembly.81 Perhaps because of the grave importance of the
crimes tried at an eisangelia, there was no penalty for
failing to win one-fifth of the vote.82 The law on eisangeliai
mentioned two types of corruption: military generals who
“took gifts” while on campaign; and public speakers who
advocated “against the people’s interests” after taking
money.83 As with euthūnai, the penalties for both were
either death or a tenfold fine.84 This Section will focus on the
eisangelia as it applied to military generals; the next
Section will look at the eisangelia in reference to public
speakers. In addition, we hear of ambassadors prosecuted
via eisangelia for taking bribes while on an embassy, but we
do not know what the exact wording of that law would have
been.85
81. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 159.
82. Id. at 214-15. In the 330s toward the end of the democracy, however, the
Athenians instituted a monetary penalty to make the eisangelia more in line
with other public trials. See CHRIST, THE LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN supra note 16, at
136-37.
83. Hyperides, In Defence of Euxenippus, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS:
LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note 59, § 8 (Hyp. 4.8).
84. This is apparent from the actual penalties meted out. For instance, the
general Ergocles was killed. See DEMOSTHENES, On the False Embassy, in 2
DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA DE FALSA LEGATIONE, supra note 73, § 180 (Dem.
19.180); LYSIAS, Against Ergocles, in LYSIAS, supra note 16, §§ 1-17 (Lys. 28.117); LYSIAS, Against Philocrates, in LYSIAS, supra note 16, §§ 2, 5 (Lys. 29.2,
29.5). At the same time, the general Timotheus was fined the astonishing sum of
100 talents. See Dinarchus, Against Demosthenes, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS:
LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES, AND HYPERIDES, supra note 59, § 14 (Din.
1.14); Dinarchus, Against Philocles, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS,
DINARCHUS, DEMADES, AND HYPERIDES, supra note 59, § 17 (Din. 3.17); DIODORUS
SICULUS bk. 16, ch. 21, § 4 (Charles L. Sherman trans., Harvard Univ. Press
reprt. ed. 1963) (Diod. 16.21.4); ISOCRATES, Antidosis, in 2 ISOCRATES § 129
(George Norlin trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1961) (Isocr. 15.129).
85. Examples include Timagoras, see DEMOSTHENES, On the False Embassy,
in 2 DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA DE FALSA LEGATIONE, supra note 73, § 137 (Dem.
19.137); PLUTARCH, Artaxerxes, in 11 PLUTARCH’S LIVES: ARATUS, ARTAXERXES,
GALBA AND OTHO ch. 22, § 6 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., Harvard Univ. Press
reprt. ed. 1962) (Plut. Art. 22.6), and Epicrates, Andocides, Eubulides, and
Cratinus, see DEMOSTHENES, On the False Embassy, in 2 DEMOSTHENES: DE
CORONA DE FALSA LEGATIONE, supra note 73, §§ 277-80 (Dem. 19.277-80);
LYSIAS, Against Epicrates and His Fellow Envoys, in LYSIAS, supra note 16, §§ 116 (Lys. 27).
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Though ostensibly distinguished based on whether
officials were in office or out of office, the design of the
euthūnai and eisangelia procedures actually seems to point
to different democratic values fostered by each process. On
the one hand, the mandatory nature of euthūnai
represented a standardization of process: an egalitarian
commitment to the rule of law giving all officials the same
treatment.86 Having each and every public official line up to
have their accounts examined thus dramatized a conception
of political justice predicated on arms-length, professional
ties.87
On the other hand, the ad hoc nature of the eisangelia
process suggests a different focus. Another way of looking at
the euthūnai-eisangelia distinction is in terms of elected
versus lotteried executive positions. Of our twelve securely
attested eisangeliai for bribery, not one is against an official
who acquired his position by lot; all are for ambassadors,
generals, or public speakers.88 By contrast, we have a mix of
euthūnai for elected and lotteried officials.89 What prompted
citizens to bring these most serious prosecutions forward,
86. In fact, this seems to have been the overarching purpose when mandatory
euthūnai were first implemented. See CONOVER, supra note 26, at 166-67, 26970. This procedure was created alongside a broad standardization of political
practices, including the rhetoric of public praise, see David Whitehead, Cardinal
Virtues: The Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens, 44 CLASSICA
ET MEDIAEVALIA 37, 47 (1993), the language on public decrees, see RHODES, THE
ATHENIAN BOULE 52-81 (1972) [hereinafter RHODES, THE ATHENIAN BOULE], and
the awarding of civic honors, see AESCHINES, Against Timarchus, in THE
SPEECHES OF AESCHINES, supra note 35, §§ 111-12 (Aeschin. 1.111-12);
ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 46, § 1 (Athen. Pol.
46.1); DEMOSTHENES, Against Androtion, in 3 DEMOSTHENES: AGAINST MEIDIAS,
ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON, supra note 16, §§ 36, 3839 (Dem. 22.36, 22.38-9).
87. This point is developed at length in CONOVER, supra note 26, at 162-67.
88. See numbers 19 (Epicrates, Andocides, Eubulides, and Cratinos,
ambassadors), 22 (Ergocles, general), 25 (Thrasybulus, general), 26 (Timagoras,
ambassador), 27 (Callistratus, public speaker), 28 (Timotheus, general), 29
(Philocrates, ambassador), 31 (Aeschines, ambassador), 33 (Euxenippos, public
speaker) in the list of bribery trials in Claire Taylor, Bribery in Athenian Politics
Part I: Accusations, Allegations, and Slander, 48 GREECE & ROME 53, 59-61
(2001) [hereinafter Taylor, Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I].
89. See, for example, numbers 8 (Laches, elected general) and 16 (unnamed
administrative official) in the list of bribery trials in id. at 58-59.
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therefore, seems to have been intrinsic to the elected
officials’ functions. Recall that lotteried officials worked
almost exclusively on boards of ten, while elected officials
were more akin to experts and given greater discretion in
the execution of their public functions. This evidence
suggests, though cannot prove, that eisangeliai for bribery
were specifically “about” curbing abuses of executive
discretion.
If that inference is correct, then the design of the
eisangelia procedure suggests that, through bribery trials,
the Athenians reaffirmed the political authority of the
people. In particular, they redecided the value of a policy
originally ratified by the Assembly and allegedly corrupted
by an official. A significantly larger number of citizens were
present at an eisangelia than at euthūnai; indeed, the
eisangelia trial itself often was conducted at the Pnyx, the
same location where the Assembly had voted on the policy
in question.90 Just as the procedures for prosecuting judicial
bribery reaffirmed popular justice by replicating trials, the
eisangelia procedure seems to have legitimated the people’s
authority by replicating a deliberative policy vote by the
Assembly. Those officials who had overstepped their bounds
and used too much discretion were punished severely. Of
the ten eisangeliai for bribery for which we know the
outcome and penalty, eight resulted in death,91 one resulted

90. The original public proposal for an eisangelia occurred at a full meeting
(ekklesia kyria) of the Assembly. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note
33, at 214. At that time, the citizen bringing the charge proposed whether to try
the case in a popular court or before the Assembly. Id. Those cases tried before
the Assembly would have been held on the Pnyx, where normal Assembly
meetings were held. Id. at 128, 133-34.
91. See numbers 20 (Epicrates, Andocides, Eubulides, and Cratinus), 22
(Ergocles), 26 (Timagoras), 27 (Callistratus), and 29 (Philocrates) in the list of
bribery trials in Taylor, Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I, supra note 88, at 5960.
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in the largest financial penalty ever imposed at Athens,92
and only one resulted in acquittal.93
C. Regulations Against Legislative Bribery
Because of its immense political authority, the
Assembly needed to aggregate and sift through high quality
information by necessity.94 As the Athenians learned with
the disastrous Sicilian expedition during the Peloponnesian
War, the costs of poor information could be catastrophic.95
When deliberating, the Athenians likely took cues from each
other—applauding a trusted expert, for example, or
shouting down someone who had a bad track record of
public proposals—and thereby aggregated the wisdom of the
crowds.96 Yet this type of knowledge aggregation was
exceptionally vulnerable to breaches in public trust.
Precisely because the Athenians trusted that any given
92. Timotheus was fined the impossibly high sum of 100 talents—or nearly
seventy percent of the annual income of all of Athens at the time. Dinarchus,
Against Demosthenes, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS,
DEMADES, HYPERIDES supra note 59, § 17 (Din. 1.17). On this calculation, see
HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 316.
93. See number 31 (Aeschines) in the list of bribery trials in Taylor, Bribery
in Athenian Politics Part I, supra note 88, at 58-61.
94. Ober helpfully walks through Athens’ necessity for epistemic quality in
its public deliberations. OBER, DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE: INNOVATION AND
LEARNING IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 80-117 (2008) [hereinafter OBER, DEMOCRACY
AND KNOWLEDGE].
95. Even in antiquity, the Sicilian Expedition became emblematic of the
Assembly’s perceived inadequacies. See OBER, POLITICAL DISSENT IN DEMOCRATIC
ATHENS: INTELLECTUAL CRITICS OF POPULAR RULE 104-20 (1998). The
vulnerability of the Assembly to make poor collective decisions at the end of the
fifth century is also borne out by the contemporary creation of a procedure for
illegal proposals, or graphē paranomōn, see HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY,
supra note 33, at 205-12, and the distinction between public decrees
(psēphismata) and laws (nomoi), which were forged through the complex process
of lawmaking, or nomothesia, see id. at 168-69.
96. In the lawcourts, for instance, the approving or censuring shout
(thorubos) from the crowd helped jurors reach a decision. For helpful
explorations of this phenomenon, see generally Victor Bers, Dikastic Thorubos,
in CRUX: ESSAYS IN GREEK HISTORY PRESENTED TO G.E.M. DE STE. CROIX ON HIS
75TH BIRTHDAY 1-15 (P.A. Cartledge & F.D. Harvey eds., 1985); Adriaan M.
Lanni, Spectator Sport or Serious Politics? Hoi Periestekotes and the Athenian
Lawcourts, 117 J. HELLENIC STUD. 183 (1997).
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speaker truly spoke what he personally thought was best,
bribery of public speakers was a particularly pernicious
offense. As Peter Euben explains, “A bribe destroyed [the]
conflation of man and policy”: with such legislative bribery,
the Athenians could no longer hold accountable the source
of a proposed policy.97
As a result, the Athenians developed a range of informal
and formal measures to prosecute such legislative
corruption. On the informal side, there were a few different
oaths sworn by members of various political bodies. When
jurors were first sworn in for the year, they took an oath not
to “take gifts illicitly in exchange for [their] vote in the
Heliaia,” as Athens’ earliest court was called.98 Further, a
public curse spoken at meetings of the Assembly and
Council appears to have condemned a long list of
impeachable offenses, including committing bribery and
then speaking in public “against the people’s interests.”99
Although no source explicitly attests to a clause against
bribery in the oath sworn by Council members, such a
clause is likely, if only based on analogy to other oaths and
97. J. PETER EUBEN, CORRUPTING YOUTH: POLITICAL EDUCATION, DEMOCRATIC
CULTURE, AND POLITICAL THEORY 103 (1997). When public trust began to wane,
therefore, it was public speakers who were first suspected of corruption. See
DEMOSTHENES, On the False Embassy, in 2 DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA DE FALSA
LEGATIONE, supra note 73, §§ 182-84 (Dem. 19.182-84); see also CONOVER, supra
note 26, at 175-80.
98. DEMOSTHENES, Against Timocrates, in 3 DEMOSTHENES: AGAINST MEIDIAS,
ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON, supra note 16, § 150
(Dem. 24.150). This clause is preserved only in a version of the Heliastic Oath
inserted by a scholiast into a speech of Demosthenes. Id. §§ 149-51. On this
oath, see HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 182-83. The
authenticity of the bribery clause has recently been questioned. See id. at 182;
David C. Mirhady, The Dikast’s Oath and the Question of Fact, in HORKOS: THE
OATH IN GREEK SOCIETY 48, 50 (Alan H. Sommerstein & Judith Fletcher eds.,
2007). Yet based on comparanda from other jury oaths in local Attic demes,
Harrison seems correct in finding the clause authentic. A. R. W. HARRISON, 2
THE LAW OF ATHENS 48 (1971). For further discussion, see CONOVER, supra note
26, at 255 n.7.
99. The reconstruction of the curse accurately records the sense of this clause
as “takes bribes to speak against the interests of Athens.” RHODES, THE
ATHENIAN BOULE, supra note 86, at 37. This particular wording, though, might
date to the second half of the democracy. See CONOVER, supra note 26, at 256
n.8.
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to the curse at the beginning of meetings of the Council.100
The oaths and curses called for a licit form of community
violence against an offender, though not through formal
judicial process. Thus, in one early example, the Athenians
rose up as a community and stoned the Councilman Lycides
and his family when he proposed that the Council listen to a
messenger from the Persians.101
Inherent in their design and the nature of their
penalties, these early public pronouncements reified the
boundaries of new political bodies in the democracy. In
essence, they grasped at some kind of accountability, even
when bribery threatened to hold the true source of a policy
proposal beyond the realm of accountability. The
punishment of cursing and stoning an offender was a way to
remove a pollution threatening the city like a foreign
enemy.102 By removing that enemy “outsider,” the
community reasserted the pure, uncorrupted physical and
symbolic boundaries of the Council’s, or Assembly’s, or
jury’s domain.
At the same time, it is significant that these were only
informal processes: we have no attested example of a juror,
Assembly member, or Councilman being brought to trial for
taking bribes. Such a distinction between informal and
formal enforcement mechanisms shielded participants from
legal liability. In so doing, it qualitatively distinguished the
100. See RHODES, THE ATHENIAN BOULE, supra note 86, at 12-13. In addition,
an early oath sworn by archons—the most important public officials prior to the
democracy—included a clause against “taking gifts for the sake of one’s office.”
ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch. 55, § 5 (Athen. Pol.
55.5); see CONOVER, supra note 26, at 255.
101. See HERODOTUS, The Histories, in 4 HERODOTUS bk. 9, ch. 3-5 (A.D. Godley
trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1961) (Hdt. 9.3-5). On this episode, see
also DANIELLE S. ALLEN, THE WORLD OF PROMETHEUS: THE POLITICS OF
PUNISHING IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS 143-45 (2000); CONOVER, supra note 26, at
258-60; HERODOTUS: HISTORIES BOOK IX 107-08 (Michael A. Flower & John
Marincola eds., 2002); Lycurgus, Against Leocrates, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS:
LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note 59, § 122 (Lyc. 1.122).
102. Note how, according to Lycurgus, Lycides’ recommendation was
tantamount to betraying the city. See Lycurgus, Against Leocrates, in 2 MINOR
ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note 59, §
122 (Lyc. 1.122). For the contiguities between stoning and religious purification,
see ALLEN, supra note 101, at 205-06.
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collective judgments of the Assembly, Council, or courts
from those made by, say, public officials who were formally
liable for their actions. Just as these oaths and curses seem
to have reaffirmed the symbolic boundaries of political
bodies, therefore, they seem to have reified the sanctity of
decisions made by those bodies.
In addition to such informal oaths and curses, there
were two formal measures that could be used against public
speakers. As we saw in the previous Section, frequent public
speakers (rhētores) were subject to an eisangelia for “taking
money and speaking against the public’s interest.”103 As
with the eisangelia against generals, the punishment was
either death or a tenfold fine, and prosecutors risked
nothing by bringing a suit: there were no penalties for
withdrawing an accusation or failing to win one-fifth of the
vote.104 There also was a graphē dōrōn based on a general
law against giving and taking gifts “to the harm of the
people,” as well as for making corrupt promises.105 This
could be used against any private citizen,106 and the penalty
was probably atimia, which originally meant outlawry but
later came to mean civic disfranchisement.107
103. Hyperides, Defence of Euxenippus, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS,
DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note 59, § 8 (Hyp 4.8).
104. See HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 215-18.
105. DEMOSTHENES, Against Meidias, in 3 DEMOSTHENES: AGAINST MEIDIAS,
ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON, supra note 16, § 113
(Dem. 21.113); see also CONOVER, supra note 26, at 215; Hashiba, supra note 51,
at 67-74; MacDowell, Athenian Laws About Bribery, supra note 36, at 74-76.
106. See DEMOSTHENES, Against Meidias, in 3 DEMOSTHENES: AGAINST
MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON, supra note 16,
§§ 110-14 (discussing how the statute might apply to Demosthenes’ opponent
Meidias) (Dem. 21.110-14).
107. The ancient sources give conflicting accounts of the penalties for bribery
under a graphē dōrōn. Aeschines lists only atimia as a penalty for the graphē
dōrōn, see AESCHINES, Against Ctesiphon, in THE SPEECHES OF AESCHINES, supra
note 35, § 232 (Aesch. 3.232), while both Dinarchus, see Dinarchus, Against
Demosthenes, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES,
HYPERIDES, supra note 59, § 60 (Din. 1.60), and Hyperides, see Hyperides,
Against Demosthenes, in 2 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS,
DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note 59, at frag. 6 (Hyp 5.24), claim that the
penalty was either death or a tenfold fine. We can reconcile these by positing
that a tenfold fine and death applied only at euthūnai or an eisangelia, which
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Both of these formal measures reflected a cornerstone of
the democracy: that citizens were free to do as they
pleased—up until that action harmed the people as a
whole.108 Indeed, both seem to have been back-door ways to
regulate essentially private dealings, whether of public
speakers collaborating with interested parties seeking
public support for their idea, or of citizens engaged in any
activity (the graphē dōrōn is that vague).109 Like the
informal oaths, therefore, these formal measures reinstated
the public accountability that had been destabilized by
bribes. The law drew the line at the precise moment when
those dealings had a detrimental effect on the community:
when a speaker proposed something against the people’s
interest, or when gifts or promises caused harm to the
people. Encouraging all citizens to evaluate their own
conduct based on its harm or benefit to the community,
these procedures also fostered a democratic ethos.
II. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ATHENS’
ANTI-BRIBERY REFORMS
Having surveyed the distinct ways in which the
Athenians democratized their enforcement procedures for
regulating bribery in Part I, Part II attempts to gauge how
helpful Athens’ novel approach to anti-corruption reform
originally would have been called a graphē. If correct, that would mean that, as
Aeschines attests, atimia (disfranchisement) was the only penalty used in a
graphē dōrōn suit.
108. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 1, at bk. 6, § 1320a30 (Aristot. Pol.
1320a30); DEMOSTHENES, Against Androtion, in 3 DEMOSTHENES: AGAINST
MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON, supra note 16,
§ 51 (Dem. 22.51); LYSIAS, Defence Against a Charge of Subverting the
Democracy, in LYSIAS, supra note 16, at 33 (Lys. 25.33); see also HANSEN, THE
ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 74-81; Lanni, Social Norms, supra note
63, at 726-29.
109. Lanni shows how the Athenian courts often regulated private conduct
and extra-statutory norms in precisely this kind of indirect manner. See Lanni,
Social Norms, supra note 63, at 694, 710-17. Demosthenes suggests that the
graphē dōrōn could have been used against someone who had bribed another to
bring a lawsuit against a third party. See DEMOSTHENES, Against Timocrates, in
3 DEMOSTHENES: AGAINST MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES,
ARISTOGEITON, supra note 16, §§ 104-13 (Dem. 24.104-13).
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was. Absolute measures of reform success are, of course,
impossible. Even in contemporary societies, it is impossible
to measure, say, how many officials decide against taking
bribes in light of some recent reform or another. 110
Moreover, whereas political scientists can take new
measurements on contemporary societies—conduct new
surveys on perceptions or experiences of corruption, for
example—Athens is a historical society (and quite ancient
at that!). We cannot conduct new measurements; we are
limited to what precious little data we already have.
Theory and practice seem to point to completely
divergent conclusions about the prevalence of bribery in
ancient Athens. On the one hand, recall that anti-corruption
reform advocates focus on diffusing political power and
reducing discretion while increasing accountability.111 In
theory, then, the Athenians enacted near paradigmatic
institutions for minimizing bribery. The potential
monopolization of resources, whether political, economic, or
judicial, was slim. The vast majority of public officials at
Athens were selected by lottery for one-year terms and
worked collaboratively on executive boards, not
individually; similarly, the most significant court cases were
decided by juries consisting of hundreds of Athenians,
selected at random from a pool of 6,000 potential jurors each
year.112 Likewise, because the people tasked them with
explicit charges, executive boards effectively had little
discretionary power on their own.113 Finally, Athens
subjected all public officials to mandatory scrutiny, in
addition to a range of other laws and legal procedures under
which they might be prosecuted.114 By modern standards,
110. See Morris, supra note 11, at 389-94 (surveying different methodologies
for measuring contemporary corruption and concluding that each may well only
partially measure the problem); A.J. Brown, What Are We Trying to Measure?
Reviewing the Basics of Corruption Definition, in MEASURING CORRUPTION 57,
57, 61-69 (Charles Sampford et al. eds., 2006) (posturing that measuring
corruption hinges on a universal definition of corruption and no such definition
exists).
111. See supra text accompanying note 23.
112. See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
113. See discussion supra Part I.B.
114. See discussion supra Part I.B-C.
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the penalties attached to these laws—a tenfold fine,
disfranchisement, or death—would be considered extreme
and, one might imagine, effective ways to hold officials
accountable.
On the other hand, two different empirical measures
suggest just the opposite conclusion: that the number of
Athenian officials who took gifts was very high by western
standards. First, the number of bribery prosecutions and
convictions at Athens, to say nothing of instances that never
came to trial, is enormously high by western standards.115
Even with considerable gaps in the ancient evidence, we
have attested thirty-two different prosecutions of bribery
with an additional twenty-two cases of varying degrees of
certainty; all but a handful of these cases fall during the
period 430 to 322, the best-attested period of the
democracy.116 At least thirty-six of these fifty-four trials
resulted in conviction.117 Although extrapolating from the

115. Scholarly estimates run the gamut. See Harvey, supra note 26, at 102
(“more [frequent] than would be regarded as acceptable in our own society”);
MacDowell, Athenian Laws About Bribery, supra note 36, at 78 (noting that
bribery was widespread); S. Perlman, On Bribing Ambassadors, 17 GREEK
ROMAN & BYZANTINE STUD. 223, 231 (“not a very widespread custom”); Strauss,
supra note 16, at 73 (stating there was widespread peculation); Taylor, Bribery
in Athenian Politics Part II, supra note 37, at 168 (“[T]here was not so much a
bribery culture, more an accusation of bribery culture.”) (emphasis in original).
“Given the tremendous gaps in [the ancient] sources, however, the unusually
high prevalence of bribery attested in [these] sources is most likely only the tip
of the iceberg.” See CONOVER, supra note 26, at 21 n.25 (citing RYSZARD KULESZA,
DIE BESTECHUNG IM POLITISCHEN LEBEN ATHENS IM 5. UND 4. JAHRUNDERT V.
CHR. KONSTANZ 39-40 (1995)).
116. For the catalog of bribery trials, see KULESZA, supra note 115, at 85-90
and, for a slightly modified list in English, see Taylor, Bribery in Athenian
Politics Part I, supra note 88, at 58-61.
117. For the thirty-four known bribery trials—thirty-two known plus two for
which bribery is mentioned in the ancient sources but not at the trial—nineteen
resulted in conviction, four resulted in acquittal, six presumably resulted in
acquittal, and the result for five is unknown. See CONOVER, supra note 26, at 21
n.27. Of the remaining twenty trials, seventeen resulted in conviction, one
probably did so, there was one acquittal, and one with unknown outcome. Id. Of
these latter seventeen convictions, however, nine come from the trial of the
Treasurers of Hellas (Hellēnotamiai), who reportedly were convicted unjustly;
the tenth was saved from certain death when proof of his innocence was
discovered at trial. See Antiphon, On the Murder of Herodes, in 1 MINOR ATTIC
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ancient evidence is hazardous, we can plausibly estimate
that roughly six to ten percent of major public officials
would have been brought to trial on accusations of bribery,
and roughly half of those officials would have been
convicted.118
Second, Athenians accused each other of taking bribes
with similar frequency: a remarkable 450 accusations
running the gamut of our extant literary sources for the
democracy, or one for every twelve pages of Greek.119 We
have already examined the legal processes for prosecuting
bribery, but it should be pointed out that many of these
laws and procedures underwent significant change
throughout the democracy, particularly in the fifth
century.120 These numbers suggest a far from “ideal” volume
of bribery in ancient Athens.
Even if we cannot obtain an unambiguous measure of
the absolute volume of bribery by Athenian public officials,
we can nevertheless glean some faint trends in the overall
patterns of corruption that appeared in Athens over the
course of the democracy. First, the sheer volume of bribery
trials contrasts with only a spike in embezzlement trials in
the 390’s, when concerns over the depleted Treasury were
paramount, and an absence of any attested trials of fraud or
extortion.121 This correlates with the literary record, where
accusations of bribery are legion, while accusations of
embezzlement are isolated, and accusations of extortion are
virtually nonexistent.
Second, there seems to have been a consistently high
rate of bribery trials. In our two best-documented periods of
the democracy, from the 420’s through the 390’s and from
the 340’s through the 320’s, there were seventeen and
ORATORS: ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES §§ 69-71 (K.J. Maidment trans., Harvard
Univ. Press. reprt. ed. 1960) (Ant. 5.69-71).
118. See CONOVER, supra note 26, at 21.
119. Id. at 3-4.
120. See generally CONOVER, supra note 26, at 233-94; Hashiba, supra note 51;
MacDowell, Athenian Laws About Bribery, supra note 36; infra app. I.
121. On these trials, see Strauss, supra note 16, at 70-71. See generally
HANSEN, EISANGELIA , supra note 54.
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eighteen securely attested bribery trials of major officials,
respectively.122 These trials follow a well-known trend from
predominantly euthūnai in the fifth century to
predominantly eisangeliai in the fourth century.123 For this
last period, a spike in references to an “unbribable”
politician suggests a perception of frequent corruption, as
more politicians tried to rescue their reputation.124
122. These numbers follow from a modified count based on Kulesza’s catalog of
bribery trials. See KULESZA, supra note 115, at 85-90.
123. Hansen documents this trend for all crimes prosecuted using either
process. See generally HANSEN, EISANGELIA, supra note 54. Euthūnai for bribery
were relatively common in the fifth century: we have two securely attested
euthūnai, as well as five more probable euthūnai in the last three decades of the
fifth century. The securely attested euthūnai for bribery are for the general
Phormion, ANDROTION, in 3B DIE FRAGMENTE DER GRIECHISCHEN HISTORIKER,
supra note 72, at ch. 324, § 8 (Androtion FGrH 324 F 8), and the general Paches,
PLUTARCH, Aristides, in 2 PLUTARCH’S LIVES: THEMISTOCLES AND CAMILLUS
ARISTIDES AND CATO MAJOR CIMON AND LUCULLUS, supra note 72, at ch. 26, § 3
(Plut. Arist. 26.3); PLUTARCH, Nicias, in 3 PLUTARCH’S LIVES: PERICLES AND
FABIUS MAXIMUS NICIAS AND CRASSUS, supra note 72, at ch. 6, §§ 1-2; (Plut. Nic.
6.1-2). The defendant in Lysias 21 also was probably at his euthūnai; and it is
likely that the generals Sophocles, Pythodorus, and Eurymedon were also
convicted at euthūnai: they were convicted by “the Athenians in the city,” see 2
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, supra note 74, at bk. 4, ch.
65, § 3 (Thuc. 4.65.3), which might refer to either euthūnai or an eisangelia. If
the reference in Aristophanes’ Wasps to Laches’ euthūnai is accurate, then the
general Laches was also convicted at euthūnai. See ARISTOPHANES, Wasps, in 2
ARISTOPHANES: CLOUDS, WASPS, PEACE lines 240-2, 894-7, 960-1 (Jeffrey
Henderson trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1998) (Aristoph. V. 240-2, 894-7, 960-1).
By contrast, we have attested only two possible examples from the fourth
century, both from the 390s. The ambassadors Epicrates, Phormisius, and
Onamasis were tried probably at euthūnai. LYSIAS, Against Epicrates and His
Fellow Envoys, in LYSIAS, supra note 16, § 1 (Lys. 27.1); PLUTARCH, Pelopidas, in
5 PLUTARCH’S LIVES: AGESILAUS AND POMPEY PELOPIDAS AND MARCELLUS, supra
note 73, at ch. 30, § 7 (Plut. Pelop. 30.7). The law-inscriber Nicomachus was also
probably tried at euthūnai, although his trial might not have been for
corruption. See LYSIAS, Against Nicomachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 16, § 9 (Lys.
30.9).
124. See OBER, MASS AND ELITE, supra note 38, at 236-38. Examples of
“unbribable” politicians include Phocion, PLUTARCH, Phocion, in 8 PLUTARCH’S
LIVES: SERTORIUS AND EUMENES PHOCION AND CATO THE YOUNGER ch. 18, ch. 21
§§ 3-5, ch. 30, §§ 1-5 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed.
1959) (Plut. Phoc. 18, 21.3-5, 30.1-5), and Lycurgus, 2 Inscriptiones Graecae:
Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno Posteriors 457.13 (Johannes Kirchner ed., 2d
ed. 1913) (IG ii2 457.13). On this point, see also AESCHINES, Against Ctesiphon,
in THE SPEECHES OF AESCHINES, supra note 35, § 82 (Aeschin. 3.82);
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That spike may indicate a broader shift, moreover, in
terms of who was committing bribery. Although judicial
bribery seems to have been a persistent and unsolved
problem in Athens, the Athenians may have had more
success combating other types of bribery.125 In the fifth
century, of the ten securely attested bribery trials, seven
were against generals,126 with one against a public
speaker,127 and zero against ambassadors.128 By contrast, in
the fourth century, of thirty-one securely attested trials,
just three were against generals (none later than the
350’s),129 while there were at least eleven trials against each
of the public speakers and ambassadors.130 This trend was
DEMOSTHENES, Against Theocrines, in 6 DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE ORATIONS, supra
note 35, § 35 (Dem. 58.35); DEMOSTHENES, On the Crown, in 2 DEMOSTHENES: DE
CORONA DE FALSA LEGATIONE, supra note 73, § 250 (Dem. 18.250); DEMOSTHENES,
On the False Embassy, in 2 DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA DE FALSA LEGATIONE,
supra note 73, §§ 4, 27, 232, 274 (Dem. 19.4, 19.27, 19.232, 19.274).
125. The legal procedures for prosecuting judicial bribery appear only in the
late fifth century. ARISTOTLE, The Athenian Constitution, supra note 34, at ch.
27, § 5 (Athen. Pol. 27.5). For a discussion on this point, see CONOVER, supra
note 26, at 246-48; MacDowell, Athenian Laws About Bribery, supra note 36, at
63-69. Likewise, repeated changes to the jury selection procedure occurred from
ca. 420 to the 370s. MacDowell, Athenian Laws About Bribery, supra note 36, at
65-67. And even after that we hear of the extraordinary reenrollment of all
citizens in 346/5 and additional judicial bribery suits. AESCHINES, Against
Timarchus, in THE SPEECHES OF AESCHINES, supra note 35, §§ 86-87 (Aeschin.
1.86-87).
126. See numbers 5 (Cimon), 8 (Laches), 9 (Sophocles, Eurymedon, and
Pythodorus) in the list of bribery trials in Taylor, Bribery in Athenian Politics
Part I, supra note 88, at 58. In addition, I consider securely attested numbers 45
(Phormio) and 46 (Laches—but sources should read Paches) in the list of bribery
trials in KULESZA, supra note 115, at 85-90.
127. See number 6 (Agoratus) in the list of bribery trials in KULESZA, supra
note 115, at 86.
128. The remaining two securely attested bribery trials are number 16
(unnamed official) in Taylor, Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I, supra note 88,
at 59, and one where private citizens were tried for being bribed to bring false
prosecutions, Antiphon, On the Choreutes, in 1 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: ANTIPHON
AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 117, §§ 49-50 (Ant. 6.49-50).
129. See numbers 22 (Ergocles, 389), 25 (Thrasybulus, 388/7), 28 (Timotheus,
356/5) in Taylor, Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I, supra note 88, at 60.
130. For trials against public speakers, see numbers 27 (Callistratos), 33
(Euxenippos), 34 (Demosthenes and nine others) in Taylor, Bribery in Athenian
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accompanied by a discursive shift toward describing bribery
in ways that resemble “influence markets” today.131 In a
range of different contexts, accusers posited that a network
of corrupt citizens was influencing public policy decisions
and the distribution of rewards within society.132 The focus
on corrupt public speakers and ambassadors—who formed
the crucial political nodes for major policy decisions—thus
may have emblematized a broader shift in how politics was
conducted.
These trends, if they even can be called that, should be
accepted only with great caution. The ancient evidence for
Athens as a whole, and particularly for the quotidian
workings of politics, is woefully incomplete: the presence or
absence of a single attestation of bribery in certain periods
can shape our perceptions of any “trend.” That said, I would
call the record incomplete, not ambiguous. If the above
analysis presents even a remotely accurate picture of
democratization and reform in Athens, we can generally
correlate Athens’ anti-bribery reforms with a long-term
trend toward less disruptive forms of corruption.
Specifically, the arc of Athens’ development suggests a
movement from individual to institutional corruption. Even
with judicial bribery, there does not seem to have been an
issue of certain individuals consistently receiving corrupt
judgments.
Politics Part I, supra note 88, at 60-61. For trials against Ambassadors, see
numbers 19 (Epicrates, Phormisios, and Onomasas), 20 (Epicrates, Andocides,
Eubulides, and Cratinos), 26 (Timagoras), 29 (Philocrates), 30 (Aeschines), 31
(Aeschines) in id. at 59-60.
131. The term “influence markets” comes from Johnston’s typology of
syndromes of corruption. See JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION, supra note
3, at 38-43. Describing advanced western democracies almost exclusively,
influence markets tend to have steady political competition and participation, as
well as mature markets. See id. Corruption in influence markets involves access
to, and competition over, advantages within established institutions; corrupt
actors focus on influencing policy and work within the system to do so. See id. at
38-43, 60-88.
132. CONOVER, supra note 26, at 169-211. Distinctive in these accusations was
the idea that a corrupt network, of which the accused bribe-taker was a
member, was redistributing rewards—civic honors, policy decisions, etc.—to
benefit the network as a whole. Id. The picture was not one in which a single
corrupt agent redirected resources for his own private gain.
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This result is both tentative and correlative: proving
causation is impossible. Nevertheless, Part III will look at
one way in which Athens’ approach to anti-corruption
reform could have fostered a long-term trend toward less
disruptive patterns of corruption.
III. SOME ADVANTAGES TO ATHENIAN-STYLE REFORM
We have seen that deep democratization heavily
informed Athens’ anti-bribery reforms. In designing
enforcement processes to combat judicial, executive, and
legislative bribery, the Athenians focused on reifying
democratic values rather than optimally policing her public
officials. Although the total volume of bribery may not have
decreased, Athens’ approach nevertheless may well have
paid off by shifting patterns of corruption to less disruptive
forms over time.
Part III moves away from delineating historical
causation, which would be impossible, to understanding the
importance of institutional design choices. In particular, I
focus here on one of Athens’ most novel legal designs: the
creation of a private right of action so that “anyone who
wished” could bring a prosecution for bribery. Using
methods of institutional analysis culled from contemporary
legal scholars and political scientists, I will assess the
strengths and weaknesses of this feature. It is impossible to
know, to any helpful degree of certainty, how this unusual
design choice actually affected political discourse and
practices. Here, my goal is much more modest: to
understand, simply, what effect this choice could have had.
My approach will be necessarily speculative at points, but it
is hoped that this speculation ultimately illuminates the
value of treating Athens as a successful case study in
democratization and development.
Athens’ entire legal system was predicated on private
rights of action. With no real police force and no dedicated
public prosecutors or legal professionals, the enforcement of
Athens’ laws was left to private initiative.133 The cornerstone
133. See CHRIST, THE LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN, supra note 16, at 118 (“[V]olunteer
prosecution came to occupy a position of importance in democratic Athens that
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of such a system of private initiative was ho boulomenos,
“anyone who wished” to bring a public suit.134 Certainly
wealthy litigants were at an advantage here: they could hire
expert speechwriters to craft particularly persuasive legal
speeches, and they could more readily risk the substantial
fine for failing to win one-fifth of the jury vote.135 And,
because of these potential penalties, Athens’ system of
private initiative may very well have resulted in systematic
under-enforcement of statutory offenses.136
But within the context of democratic Athens, a private
right of action for bribery suits could have offered three
main advantages as well. First, it would have minimized
the potential for corruption within the enforcement of
Athens’ anti-bribery laws. It did so by minimizing the
potential for conflicts of interest posed by local enforcement
without losing the informational advantage gained by local
enforcement. Second, although a private right of action may
have resulted in sub-optimal enforcement of anti-bribery
laws, it likely would have ensured that the most egregious
types of bribery were prosecuted. Such a ‘political’ level of
enforcement would have distorted perceived enforcement
rates and communicated a norm of zero-tolerance for the
most egregious forms of bribery. In the long-term, then, this
level of enforcement could have caused the trend toward
less disruptive forms of bribery. Finally, a private right of
action actively fostered greater participation in the political
process. This could have boosted the perceived legitimacy of
the democracy even at the very moment when its legitimacy
was most vulnerable. Insofar as bribery trials acted as a
kind of coordinating norm within the democracy, greater

was without parallel in the rest of the Hellenic world.”); Lanni, Social Norms,
supra note 63, at 723-26 (noting that volunteer prosecution, although central to
Athenian justice system, led to sporadic enforcement of norms).
134. CHRIST, THE LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN, supra note 16, at 118. For an overview
of the use of private initiative in Athenian litigation, see id. at 118-59
(discussing how public concerns limited the actual use of private prosecutors to
primarily suits brought on behalf of the city).
135. See id. at 33-34.
136. On this point, see Lanni, Social Norms, supra note 63, at 723-24.
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legitimacy could have created a virtuous circle of good
governance.
A. A Private Right of Action Minimized Conflicts of Interest
in Enforcement
Like corruption more generally, bribery poses
particularly thorny problems for monitoring and
enforcement because it often occurs in secret. Monitoring
costs can be high as a result.137 For this reason, numerous
anti-corruption agendas focus on increasing transparency
throughout a bureaucracy—in effect, reducing the costs of
obtaining insider information.138 But even once that
information has been made public, enforcement arms may
not necessarily act on it. As recent studies have shown, local
prosecutors who work closely with the officials they regulate
can suffer from regulatory “capture,” where sub-optimal
enforcement arises from conflicts of interest.139 What
contemporary literature on anti-bribery enforcement
suggests, therefore, is that any enforcement system needs to
137. ANECHIARICO & JACOBS, supra note 24, at 75-119; KLITGAARD, supra note
19, at 82-87.
138. E.g., KLITGAARD, supra note 19, at 82-83; ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION
supra note 3, at 162-65.

AND GOVERNMENT,

139. See Norman Abrams, The Distance Imperative: A Different Way of
Thinking About Public Official Corruption Investigations/Prosecutions and the
Federal Role, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 207, 212-27 (2011) (surveying various
problems that may arise when prosecutors are too close to the corrupted entity
they prosecute); Sanford C. Gordon, Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Public
Corruption Prosecutions, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 534, 549 (2009) (finding strong
evidence of partisan bias in U.S. Attorney prosecutions for corruption); Andrew
B. Whitford, Bureaucratic Discretion, Agency Structure, and Democratic
Responsiveness: The Case of the United States Attorneys, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY, 3, 21-22 (2002) (finding that a number of cases brought and
concluded by U.S. Attorneys depends on the affluence and political leaning of
their district). For this reason, one proposed solution has been to create
independent anti-corruption agencies on the model of the successful Hong Kong
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). KLITGAARD, supra note
19, at 107-21; ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 3, at
159-62. Lee details the success of the Hong Kong ICAC, Ambrose Lee, The
Public as Our Partner in the Fight Against Corruption, in MEASURING
CORRUPTION, supra note 110, at 221-32, but this may only shift the issue of
capture to a new agency.
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be able to leverage insider information without resulting in
regulatory capture. Athens’ private right of action seems to
have done just that. Private rights of action in the Athenian
context successfully navigated what Norman Abrams has
termed the “distance imperative”: the need to prevent
conflicts of interest in bribery prosecutions.140 These can
arise whenever there is a close working relationship
between prosecutor and police, prosecutor and judge, or
prosecutor and official.141 Put differently, such conflicts of
interest are most pronounced when a prosecutor is a repeat
player with either monopoly power or unfettered discretion
over prosecuting corrupt officials.
In ancient Athens, certainly some citizens could have
distinguished themselves by becoming repeat prosecutors in
high-profile public cases, but they did not have a monopoly
over this opportunity. Nor did their frequent appearance
before a jury court seem to have given them a sizeable
advantage; although Athenian juries seem to have rewarded
many defendants for the good works they had performed for
the city,142 they also convicted well over half of those
defendants on trial for bribery.143 Moreover, as we will see in
140. Abrams, supra note 139, at 242.
141. Id. at 212-27.
142. On juries' rewarding good behavior, see MATTHEW R. CHRIST, THE BAD
CITIZEN IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 172-81 (2006); STEVEN JOHNSTONE, DISPUTES AND
DEMOCRACY: THE CONSEQUENCES OF LITIGATION IN ANCIENT ATHENS 100-06
(1999); OBER, MASS AND ELITE, supra note 38, at 226-30; Lanni, Social Norms,
supra note 63, at 715-16.
143. Of the thirty bribery trials for which we know the outcome, twenty-one
were convictions. ANTIPHON, On the Choreutes, in 1 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS:
ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 117, §§ 49-50 (unnamed private citizens)
(Ant. 6.49-50); see numbers 6 (Callias), 9 (Sophocles, Pythodorus, and
Eurymedon), 19 (Onomasas), 20 (Epicrates, Andocides, Eubulides, and
Cratinos), 22 (Ergocles), 25 (Thrasybulus), 26 (Timagorus), 27 (Callistratus), 28
(Timotheus), 29 (Philocrates), 34 (Demosthenes and Demades) in the list of
bribery trials in Taylor, Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I, supra note 88, at 5861; numbers 6 (Agoratus), 45 (Phormio) and 46 (Laches—but sources should
read Paches) in the list of bribery trials in KULESZA, supra note 115, at 85-90.
Note that the figure of nine known acquittals is somewhat inflated, for six came
from the Harpalus affair. See number 34 in the list of bribery trials in Taylor,
Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I, supra note 88, at 61. Those particular
acquittals may have resulted, simply, from a desire to hold accountable only the
most prominent citizens involved.
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the next Section, the great majority of known prosecutors in
bribery trials were political enemies of the defendant: the
social distance between prosecutor and defendant was thus
maximized.
In addition to minimizing the potential for a conflict of
interest in enforcement, the Athenian private right of action
seems to have done a good job of leveraging sufficient
insider information for a conviction. In fact, an Athenian
prosecutor probably would have required minimal
information to secure a conviction. This was due in large
part to the way the Athenians viewed liability: public
officials often were held fully responsible for the results of
their actions, irrespective of any kind of willfulness or
intent.144 Many political trials thus hinged on considerations
of policy or satisfaction with an official’s performance—not
on legal issues of intent or, in the case of bribery, proving
quid pro quo.145 What an Athenian prosecutor really needed
by way of informational requirements was to have the
public on his side.
In Athens, therefore, the insider information
requirement turned into an issue of political will, and there
is good reason to think that the most egregious types of
bribery were consistently prosecuted as a result. Outside of
mandatory euthūnai, there were essentially two ways that a
bribery trial came about: an insider brought the corruption
to light and led the prosecution;146 or there was public
144. Hence, in many cases there is little evidence that an official actually
broke a law. See JENNIFER TOLBERT ROBERTS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN ATHENIAN
GOVERNMENT 107-13 (1982).
145. Roberts systematically goes through the sources on this point and
concludes that most political convictions represented disagreements with policy
or dissatisfaction with an official’s inadequate performance. See id. at 11-160. At
the same time, Lanni has shown how extra-statutory norms and extra-legal
considerations could influence the outcome of a trial substantially. Lanni, Social
Norms, supra note 63, at 707-10.
146. As occurred when Leon sued his fellow ambassador Timagoras,
DEMOSTHENES, On the False Embassy, in 2 DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA DE FALSA
LEGATIONE, supra note 73, § 137 (Dem. 19.137), or when Demosthenes sued his
fellow ambassador Aeschines, DEMOSTHENES, On the False Embassy, in 2
DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA DE FALSA LEGATIONE, supra note 73, §§ 1-343 (Dem.
19), or when Demosthenes sued his fellow ambassador Aeschines, AESCHINES,
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discussion over a bad outcome, possibly initiated by an
insider, and someone else led the prosecution.147 In either
case, bringing a suit would have been only moderately
expensive: court fees were only a moderate expense,
especially for elite citizens, and the case itself lasted at most
one day.148 Given the possible penalty of bringing a frivolous
bribery suit, however, it is likely nobody would have
prosecuted unless he could be assured that a substantial
portion of the people supported the suit. The more egregious
the bad outcome that had resulted from the alleged bribery,
the more likely that a would-be prosecutor would have
sufficient public support to bring a bribery suit.
The next Section will examine some of the implications
of this design. For now, it is sufficient to note that, at least
within Athens’ idiosyncratic legal system, a private right of
action for bribery suits minimized the chance of a corrupt
enforcement process, yet also succeeded in leveraging
sufficient insider information to bring at least the most
egregious types of bribery to light.149
B. A Private Right of Action Created a ‘Political’ Level of
Enforcement
Contemporary political scientists have highlighted that
two problems inherent in private rights of action stem from
On the Embassy, in THE SPEECHES
(Aeschin. 2).

OF

AESCHINES, supra note 35, §§ 1-184

147. Cimon’s bribery prosecution followed this pattern, PLUTARCH, Cimon, in 2
PLUTARCH’S LIVES: THEMISTOCLES AND CAMILLUS ARISTIDES AND CATO MAJOR
CIMON AND LUCULLUS, supra note 72, at ch. 14, §§ 1-4 (Plut. Cim. 14.1-4), as did
Lycides’ stoning at the hands of the Council, HERODOTUS, The Histories, in 4
HERODOTUS, supra note 101, at bk. 9, chs. 3-5 (Hdt. 9.3-5), although the latter
was not a formal judicial process. Thucydides reports that the general Nicias
was afraid to return from Sicily lest one of his soldiers claim that he had taken
bribes to withdraw from the island. 4 THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR, supra note 72, at bk. 7, ch. 48, § 4 (Thuc. 7.38.4).
148. See HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 187.
149. If this theoretical sketch is correct, then it might explain why convictions
were so frequent at bribery trials. If trials predominantly consisted of cases
where the public has already demonstrated sufficient outrage to risk bringing a
suit in the first place, then the case selection will be skewed ex ante in favor of
more convictions.
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the way they affect overall enforcement rates. Private rights
of action can generate bad legal outcomes: harmful
precedent that arises when individuals prioritize short-term
wins over long-term advancement of the law.150 And they
can result in over-deterrence, or at least sub-optimal
enforcement rates.151 This latter problem results from the
incentives that private litigants have to bring suit (e.g.
punitive damages),152 as well as from the failure of private
prosecutors to coordinate their actions with other enforcers,
like agencies.153 As will be clear, in Athens, only optimal
enforcement would have been a problem for private rights of
action in bribery suits. Even then, while the Athenians
probably did not achieve optimal deterrence, they
nevertheless may have achieved a ‘political’ level of
enforcement that eliminated the most disruptive forms of
bribery over the long term.
First, it is difficult to see how Athens’ private right of
action for bribery suits could have caused poor long-term
legal strategy. Just as there were no legal professionals in
the modern sense of the phrase, legal judgments by a jury
had no formally binding precedential effect. 154 Rather,
litigants could choose to cite previous cases and even
hypothesize about the reasons why those cases were decided
150. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 66-67 (2002);
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 116 (2005).
151. See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule
10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1332-36 (2008); Steven Shavell, The
Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the
Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 581-86 (1997); Stephenson, supra note 150,
at 115-16; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 201 (2000) [hereinafter Thompson, The
Continuing Innovation].
152. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 231
(1991); Rose, supra note 151, at 1333; Stephenson, supra note 150, at 115-16.
153. David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (providing a helpful reframing of this coordination
problem); see also Rose, supra note 151, at 1326-30; Stephenson, supra note 150,
at 117-18.
154. LANNI, LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 118.
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as they were, but such arguments were no more persuasive
than any other type of legal or extra-legal argumentation.155
There was little danger, therefore, that unfavorable facts in
one bribery trial might establish a poor rule for another.
The only long-term legal strategy that seemed to work was
to advance sensible arguments that appealed to common
stereotypes.156 The actions of even a careless and myopic
private prosecutor would have had an insignificant effect on
the potential litigation strategy of another.
That Athens’ private right of action resulted in suboptimal enforcement, however, is far more likely, although
the concern here would have trended toward underenforcement, not over-enforcement.157 The primary
incentives an individual had for bringing a bribery suit were
revenge and social capital: even non-elites increased their
honor by emerging victorious over their opponents. 158 In a
study of litigation patterns for all known non-political public
suits that were brought by a private party, Robin Osborne
has shown that political rivalry motivated the suit where
the offense did not have a specific victim.159 This held true
even where there was a monetary reward for winning such
a suit.160
Although bribery trials did not offer a financial award,
Osborne’s insight seems to pertain to bribery trials as well.
155. Id. at 126.
156. See LANNI, LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 59-64 (finding that these
norms were relevant as a kind of character evidence); OBER, MASS AND ELITE,
supra note 38, at 43-46 (discussing why stereotypical arguments were so
frequent in Athenian litigation); Lanni, Social Norms, supra note 49, at 700-07
(discussing six categories of such norms).
157. By contrast, contemporary scholars are quick to note potential for overenforcement with private rights of action. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 151, at
1333; Shavell, supra note 117, at 581-86; Stephenson, supra note 150, at 114-15.
158. CHRIST, THE LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN, supra note 16, at 34-36; Lanni, Social
Norms, supra note 63, at 715; see DAVID COHEN, LAW, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY
IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 61-86 (1995) (noting that revenge and social capital played
large role in Athenian litigation).
159. Robin Osborne, Law in Action in Classical Athens, 105 J. HELLENIC STUD.
40, 52 (1985). Where there was a specific victim, however, the prosecutor
overwhelmingly was the victim himself. Id.
160. See id. at 44, 47.
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Of the twenty-four securely attested bribery suits in which
we know the identity of both parties, twenty-three were
brought by a political rival.161 In other words, political
rivalry, not the merits, drove bribery prosecutions. Even
then, though, given the high rate of convictions in bribery
trials and the substantial penalties for bringing a frivolous
suit, political rivals seem to have brought suit only when
conviction was clearly probable.162 This would have led to
under-enforcement where either a bribe-taker had no
political rival or where any rival would have thought that
conviction was unlikely.
Of course, at least when it came to bribery by public
officials, private citizens were not the only ones who could
bring suit: public prosecutors (synegoroi), too, could bring
suit at an official’s mandatory euthūnai.163 There was no
meaningful coordination between these two groups, nor did
public prosecutors have a chance to preclude a claim from
going forward. In theory, then, even if private initiative on
its own resulted in under-enforcement, the combination of
161. ANTIPHON, On the Choreutes, in 1 MINOR ATTIC ORATORS: ANTIPHON AND
ANDOCIDES, supra note 117, §§ 49-50 (judicial rivals accused by Phanostratos)
(Ant. 6.49-50); see numbers 5 (Cimon accused by Pericles), 8 (Laches accused by
Cleon), 20 (Epicrates, Andocides, Eubulides, and Cratinos, all accused by
Callistratus of Aphidna), 26 (Timagoras accused by Leon), 28 (Timotheus
accused by Chares), 29 (Philocrates accused by Aeschines), 30 (Aeschines
accused by Timarchus), 31 (Aeschines accused by Demosthenes), 33 (Euxenippos
accused by Polyeuctos), and 34 (Demosthenes and nine others accused by
political rivals) in the list of bribery trials in Taylor, Bribery in Athenian Politics
Part I, supra note 88, at 58-61. The one exception is number 6 in the list of trials
in KULESZA, supra note 115, at 85-86, where Agoratos had no discernible ties to
his accuser Eudikos.
162. This argument hinges on a correlation between high rates of conviction
and, on average, better cases on the merits. Had there been more frivolous suits,
presumably those would have resulted in acquittal. Shermer points out that,
with no monetary rewards, there is a smaller chance for frivolous suits; in fact,
as he shows, historically citizens have not filed meaningless lawsuits in the
environmental law context. See Steven D. Shermer, The Efficiency of Private
Participation in Regulating and Enforcing the Federal Pollution Control Laws:
A Model for Citizen Involvement, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 461, 487-88 (1999). My
conclusion supports Adriaan Lanni’s conjecture that the entire Athenian legal
system under-enforced statutory crimes. See Lanni, Social Norms, supra note
63, at 724-25.
163. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 222.
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private and public prosecutors could have resulted in overenforcement.
The actual numbers for different types of bribery suits,
however, do not support this claim. Although the ancient
evidence is spotty, it is disproportionately weighted toward
bribery suits brought either via eisangelia or euthūnai:
there are attested only seven uses of the other procedures
combined. Ostensibly, then, the majority of bribery suits
were brought under one of these two procedures.164 For there
to have been over-enforcement, therefore, there would need
to have been a high number of euthūnai brought by
synegoroi (to be added to all other suits brought by private
citizens). Yet euthūnai are sparsely attested in the ancient
evdidence. Compared to the thirty-two certain (plus twentytwo somewhat certain) attested bribery trials, there were
only seventeen attested euthūnai total throughout the entire
democracy165 and only seven for bribery. If accusations at
euthūnai had been more common, likely the Athenians
would have expanded the number of days for private
citizens to lodge accusations at euthūnai: after all, they
apparently allotted only three days to audit 1200 officials!166
Thus, even if all of the attested euthūnai for bribery
stemmed from accusations by synegoroi, this would add
little to our total level of enforcement.
Accordingly, there does not seem to have been overenforcement caused by a lack of coordination between
private and public prosecutors. I suggest that, instead,
there was a ‘political’ level of enforcement. Although there
was nothing like an independent agency at Athens that
could have taken a synoptic view of the problem and
164. Even when we factor in the expectation that the historical record would
preserve only the most controversial cases—i.e., ones high-profile enough to
have been at an eisangelia or euthūnai—the severe imbalance in favor of these
procedures is still striking.
165. On this point, compare HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note
33, at 224 (noting there were only about fifteen euthūnai cases), with the
additions of the euthūnai of the unnamed defendant in Lysias 21 and of Laches,
which I take to be genuine, ARISTOPHANES, Wasps, in 2 ARISTOPHANES: CLOUDS,
WASPS, PEACE supra note 123, at lines 240-2, 894-7, 960-1 (Aristoph. V. 240-2,
894-7, 960-1).
166. HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 33, at 223-24.
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discerned the optimal level of enforcement, the intensely
public nature of these suits could have given Athenians a
general idea of how much bribery of what type had been
prosecuted in any given period. At least 500 jurors, and
possibly hundreds of bystanders, would have witnessed a
bribery trial, and a conviction would have quickly become
public gossip. Hence, catalogs of corrupt politicians were
common in Athens: everybody knew who had been convicted
of corruption and often for what reason.167 Though any given
Athenian may have had at best only a vague idea of “how
much” bribery had been prosecuted, the crowd as a whole
could have had a pretty good idea when it voiced its initial
approval or denial for a new bribery trial.
Recall from the previous Section that likely the cases
that would have made it to trial would have been the most
egregious cases: ones in which a substantial portion of the
people, when they heard about the events, would have
suspected bribery. A continuous string of such intensely
public cases, the great majority of which resulted in
conviction, would have distorted any would-be corrupt
official’s perception of the rate of enforcement. He likely
would have suspected that the enforcement rate was much
higher than it actually was. To the extent that his
subsequent actions were then influenced by the perceived
rate of enforcement, Athens’ pattern of bribery trials would
successfully deter him from the most egregious forms of
bribery. Over time, therefore, we could expect that this
pattern of prosecution would yield gradually less and less
disruptive (that is, less egregious or less controversial)
patterns of corruption.
C. A Private Right of Action Leveraged the Expressive
Value of the Law
The final advantage that Athens’ private right of action
created is something rarely considered by contemporary
167. See e.g., PLATO, Gorgias, in 3 PLATO: LYSIS, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAS § 515c
(W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard Univ. Press reprt. ed. 1975) (Plat. Gorg. 515c).
Such catalogs were not uncommon in speeches at bribery trials. E.g.,
DEMOSTHENES, On the False Embassy, in 2 DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA DE FALSA
LEGATIONE, supra note 73, § 137 (Dem. 19.137).
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anti-corruption advocates and factors only obliquely into
discussions of modern private rights of action.168 Reform
agendas frequently point to the vital need for public
involvement in government reform.169 And, it is true, reform
agendas are never long-lived without public support or
public monitoring. But the Athenians involved the people in
a crucially overlooked way: the people themselves were
litigating on behalf of their own community. This approach
could have yielded substantial value in terms of reinforcing
the legitimacy of the democracy.
Scholars have long recognized that citizen participation
in decision-making and enforcement fosters greater
governmental legitimacy.170 Whether this stems from merely
having a voice171 or from greater perceived treatment when
included in a decision making process,172 greater

168. Thompson briefly considers how private rights of action in the
contemporary environmental context might function as a kind of democratic
participation, but scholars have not pursued this idea further. See Thompson,
The Continuing Innovation, supra note 151, at 209.
169. See, e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 3, at
165-67 (1999) (positing that the efficacy of reforms hinges on robust public
support and discussion); Ambrose Lee, The Public as Our Partner in the Fight
Against Corruption, in MEASURING CORRUPTION, supra note 110, at 221-32
(describing how public support was vital in transforming Hong Kong from a
graft society into "one of the world’s cleanest metropolitan cities"). See generally
Michael Johnston, Fighting Systemic Corruption: Social Foundations for
Institutional Reform, 10 EUR. J. DEV. RES. June 1998, at 85 (1998) (establishing
that anti-corruption reforms need long-term social foundation).
170. See Morris & Klesner, supra note 4, at 1274-78; Shermer, supra note 162,
at 478-79; see also Michael X. Delli Carpini et al., Public Deliberation,
Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical
Literature, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 315, 332-34, 336 (2004) (surveying
experimental research on the effects of political deliberation and concluding that
they support the theory that deliberative engagement enhances legitimacy).
171. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 147 (Princeton Univ. Press
2006) (1990) (concluding that permitting public participation in decision-making
processes gives public authorities the flexibility to pursue sound long-term
policies).
172. See Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What
Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal
Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 233 (2001).
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participation can foster better governance.173 These
conclusions have usually come from studies of citizen
involvement in deliberative processes, but they may well
apply to ancient Athenian judicial involvement as well. The
law’s expressive effect in solving collective action problems
is, after all, one familiar way in which legal judgments can
foster greater cooperation and civic trust.174 And Adriaan
Lanni has recently extended this idea to the Athenian
courts.175
Yet, as we saw with the eisangelia process in particular,
there were also features specific to bribery trials that
aligned them with deliberative meetings by the Assembly.
They involved substantial numbers of citizens listening to
competing arguments over what often amounted to how a
particular policy or outcome should be evaluated. Although
bribery trials would have featured only two speakers—far
fewer than the number at deliberative meetings of the
Assembly—the signaling effect of a jury vote could have
differed little from a straight policy vote. Indeed, to the
extent that the judgment was intended to “send a message”
to others, as prosecutors frequently enjoined,176 it would
have communicated the people’s commitment to stopping
the most egregious forms of corruption. In this respect, it

173. In this respect, Warren’s idea that corruption in a democracy is a form of
civic exclusion from collective decision-making helps explain why corruption
breeds a climate of distrust that weakens political institutions. Mark E. Warren,
What Does Corruption Mean in Democracy?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 328, 333 (2004);
see also Morris & Klesner, supra note 4, at 1274-78.
174. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law
Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 19-20
(1990); see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021, 2029-32 (1996); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 993-1007 (1995).
175. See Lanni, Social Norms, supra note 63, at 720; Adriaan Lanni, The
Expressive Effect of the Athenian Prostitution Laws, 29 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 45,
58-64 (2010).
176. E.g., DEMOSTHENES, On the False Embassy, in 2 DEMOSTHENES: DE
CORONA DE FALSA LEGATIONE, supra note 73, §§ 231-32, 339-40, 343 (Dem.
19.231-32, 339-40, 343); Dinarchus, Against Demosthenes, in 2 MINOR ATTIC
ORATORS: LYCURGUS, DINARCHUS, DEMADES, HYPERIDES, supra note 59, § 11 (Din.
1.11).
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would have functioned no differently than laws and decrees
passed in the Assembly.177
In Athens’ legal system, with the Athenians’ approach
to conceptualizing bribery, private rights of action for
bringing bribery suits thus may have been closely analogous
to other forms of political participation, particularly
deliberation in the Assembly. The long-term benefits to
having a private right of action may have extended well
beyond any short-term coordination or expression of public
norms. From a procedural justice perspective, Athenian
private rights of action may actually have fostered greater
trust in the democracy as a whole.
CONCLUSION: THE VIEW FROM ATHENS
Certainly nobody would advocate a return to Athenianstyle democracy—what with its restricted franchise,
slavery, and bare guarantees of due process or substantive
rights. But Athens’ success in democratization and
development may nevertheless prove a valuable case study
for advocates of anti-corruption reforms. The democracy was
a paradigm of institutional design, if only for the way its
institutional structure constrained officials’ actions and
thereby reduced the likelihood of bribery. And the
Athenians’ novel approach to corruption—focusing on
outcomes, not intent, and designing reforms to instill
democratic values—may yet provide a clearer path to
successful reforms.
But what emerges in perhaps the sharpest focus when
we look back at Athens is the close attention paid to
institutional design. Where contemporary reform agendas
focus on monitoring, policing, and enforcement, the
Athenians homed in on enforcement, judgment, and
repairing the broken bonds of their society. They tapped
into powerful institutional design with the result that their
anti-bribery enforcement seems to have benefited the polity
above and beyond mere deterrence. Although we cannot
177. See OBER, DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE, supra note 94, at 168-210, on the
idea of Athenian legislation as a coordinating norm for aligning preferences
within the community.
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know what precise effect this institutional design had,
Athenian-style anti-corruption reform—democratization
through enforcement—may well be of value to our future.

116

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

APPENDIX I: CHRONOLOGY OF ATHENIAN ANTI-BRIBERY
MEASURES178
594/3: Original law against public officials’ receiving
bribes. Graphē dōrōn heard by the Areopagus. Punishment:
atimia (outlawry).
508/7-470’s: Addition of clauses against taking bribes
inserted into archons’ oath, jurors’ oath, curse pronounced
at beginning of Assembly and Council meetings, and
perhaps Council’s oath. Punishment: destroying offender’s
house and home (archons were to set up gold statue).
440’s-410’s: Ad hoc creation of monetary penalty for
bribery certain public officials. Originally a flat fine (10,000
drachmas).
Pre-411: bribery added to two clauses of the nomos
eisangeltikos. Specifically dealt with bribery by generals and
public speakers. Punishment: death, presumably.
440-409: Creation of graphē dekasmou for bribery of
large political bodies (Assembly, Council, jury). Prosecution
before the thesmothetai. Penalty: death.
420-404/3: Original law against bribery emended to
include giving bribes and corrupting through promises;
“harm to the community” added to the definition;
prosecution before the thesmothetai. Expanded to include
regular citizens.
404/3: Euthūnai become mandatory for all public
officials; monetary penalty for bribery at euthūnai
standardized to a tenfold fine.
420-380: Revision of jury selection procedure (jurors
assigned to court on day of trial).
380-370: Revision of jury and magistrate selection
procedures to include lottery machines (klērōtēria).
Pre-351: Creation of unnamed graphē for bribing
witnesses and/or public prosecutors (synēgoroi).

178. This chronology comes from CONOVER, supra note 26, at 240-98.
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mid-fourth century: Creation of graphē dōroxenias
before a jury court for people who had bribed a jury in a
citizenship trial. Punishment likely atimia (expulsion from
community).
346/5: Extraordinary re-registration of entire citizenry
in demes due to fears of corrupted votes on citizenship.
mid-340’s: Apophasis, or investigation to the Areopagus
Council, used to prosecute bribery. Penalty: variable, but
often tenfold fine or death.

